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Pluto Press
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Reflections on the Socio-political Roles of Islamic NGOs in West Africa Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso

*Mathias Savadogo, Muriel Gomez-Perez
and Marie Nathalie LeBlanc*

With regard to the role played by faith-based non-governmental organisations (fbNGOs), a number of conclusions can be drawn from the existing literature that are relevant to the themes of this book. First, it has been noted that in some contexts, fbNGOs can mitigate the inadequacies of both the state and the market; they have become key actors, along with the state, in socioeconomic development (Fowler 1991). Consequently, fbNGOs have come to play an active role in reactions to a number of social issues, including poverty, health, human rights, peacekeeping and the environment (Ibriga 1998: 501). In some cases, they have also played a political role that tends to support the process of democratisation put into place since the 1990s. Studies have also noted how the increased professionalism of fbNGOs, in terms of both organisational structures and worker training, has allowed them to gain credibility in the eyes of governments and the populations they serve (Fowler 1993; Sadouni 2007, 2009), while emphasising their economic role as providers of employment opportunities (Fath 2007). However, despite the growing concern in the literature regarding the role played by fbNGOs within the African context, the existing literature on locally initiated fbNGOs remains limited and mainly focused on case studies dealing with single countries or individual organisations. We have therefore chosen in this chapter to examine the social and political roles of locally initiated Islamic NGOs in three West African countries (Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso). More specifically, we

use three empirical case studies to revisit the role of fbNGOs as primary actors in the strengthening of civil society within the context of neoliberal dynamics in West Africa (Roy 2004).

In doing so, we describe and analyse the relationship between Islamic NGOs and the state in these three countries, focusing on the level of autonomy enjoyed by Islamic NGOs in relation to the state, which was often expressed as a tension between partnership and opposition. The decision to compare the roles of Islamic NGOs working in the capital cities (Dakar, Abidjan/Bouaké and Ouagadougou) is justified first, by the fact that the majority of NGOs are headquartered in them. Second, these cities experienced a surge of religious dynamism in the 1980s and 1990s, which had a significant impact on the configuration of actors in local civil society (Cissé 1994, 2009; Dao 1991; Diawara 1996; Gomez-Perez 1997, 2005; Kouanda 1989, 1996; LeBlanc 1998, 2005; Miran 2006; Otayek 1984, 1996; Sanankoua 1991; Savadogo 2005). In these cities, strong networks of community-based religious associations and the socio-political influence they wield have helped shape the dynamics of Islamic NGOs. Furthermore, these NGOs operate in states that have recently undergone significant political transformations, resulting in a realignment of the relationship between religion and politics. This is evident in the hushed collusion between Muslims and the state in Burkina Faso, the legacy of political authoritarianism left by Laurent Gbagbo and his ethno-nationalist regime in Côte d'Ivoire, and the rapid rise of the Mouride brotherhood in Senegal following the election of President Wade in 2000. Aside from these shared characteristics, there are two main differences that need to be taken into account. First, Dakar has an extremely large Muslim majority, whereas Ouagadougou and Abidjan are home to religiously mixed populations. This raises the question of whether the tensions arising from the combination of religion, politics and development differ in national contexts where Muslims are in the majority from those where they are not. Second, religious debates and identities have held a significant place in Senegal's public sphere since the late 1970s, whereas the dynamics governing the reconstitution of the public sphere in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire are more recent, dating from the beginning of the 1990s.

The discussion of Islamic NGOs in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso draws on field research conducted between 2008 and 2011 in the cities of Dakar (June 2008, February 2010 and June 2011), Abidjan and Bouaké (June and July 2008, October 2011), and Ouagadougou (March 2010, July 2011). Having compiled a list of existing locally initiated Islamic NGOs in

the four cities with the help of field assistants, we conducted interviews with the founders or directors of each NGO on the history, legal status, goals, activities, structure and financing of their organisations. In some cases, longer interviews were also conducted in order to examine the relationships between the organisation and the larger associational context, between the organisation and various state structures, and between the organisation and the political activism of its founder or director.

The argument put forward in this chapter is divided into three parts. First, we examine the political and economic context in which the Islamic NGOs emerged. In doing so, we question the notion that the emergence of these NGOs was the result of a process of political democratisation and of the withdrawal of the state through the implementation of neoliberal economic measures, especially structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Second, we analyse the relationship between locally initiated Islamic NGOs and the state in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. By highlighting the ambivalent nature of this relationship, the tension between moments of collaboration and moment of opposition, we revisit the assumption present in the existing literature on democratisation in Africa whereby actors in civil society necessarily enjoy a certain degree of autonomy in relation to the state. Finally, we analyse the objectives and selected activities of locally initiated Islamic NGOs in order to give a more nuanced picture of the links often established between Islamic NGOs and jihadism. In fact, we examine the possibility that the activities initiated by Islamic NGOs constitute an alternative to state intervention and international agencies, lying at the intersection of local and regional interests on the one hand, and supranational and communitarian ones relating to the *Ummah* on the other.

Political and Economic Context of the Emergence of Islamic NGOs

Generally speaking, the existing literature connects the emergence of Islamic NGOs with the appearance of Islamist movements in the 1970s and 1980s (Ghandour 2002: 63)² and, within the West African context, with the beginnings of the process of political democratisation in the late 1980s. With regard to Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, this was not the case. It appears that the emergence of locally initiated Islamic NGOs stemmed from the dynamism of existing associational structures at the local level, especially religious, professional and female associations.

In Senegal, the two main Islamic NGOs, Jamra and Action solidarité islamique (ASI), were offshoots of long-standing Islamic associations. Young Muslim high school students from the *Lycée Maurice Delafosse* in Dakar laid the foundations of Jamra in 1982.³ At the time, the organisation's activities revolved around the publication of a magazine of the same name, which addressed social problems such as drug abuse and prostitution. These young students went on to create the Association des jeunes amis de Djamra (AJAD). With the proliferation of associational structures in various city neighbourhoods, the editors of the magazine organised public talks in primary schools, secondary schools and colleges in the eleven regions of the country. These activities, and the growth of the association's membership among both youth and adults, led to the creation of the Organisation islamique Jamra, which established branches in every region. From this structure, the NGO Jamra was officially created in 1992. ASI was created in 1985 by civil servants educated in Western and Arab universities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Maghreb and Libya.⁴ It became an NGO in 1995.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the first multi-party elections in 1990, the creation of the Conseil national islamique (CNI) in 1993, and the consolidation of the Conseil supérieur des imams (COSIM) during the same period encouraged the establishment of a number of Islamic NGOs (created by members of the CNI or by satellite associations), such as Al Muwasaf, Le Jardin, Imaniya, Une nouvelle chance and Groupe Aslam Malekoum Islamica. For instance, Une nouvelle chance was affiliated with Imam Idriss Koudouss Koné's CNI.⁵ Its origins can be traced to an association of the same name launched in 1991 by Koné Mohamed to help Muslims in distress. Its first initiatives sought to assist Muslim patients and those who accompanied them at the Centre hospitalier et universitaire (CHU) in Treichville. Activities were focused on patient visits and material support (soap, bleach, clothing). These services were later extended to the Muslim patients of other hospitals in Abidjan (CHU de Cocody, de Yopougon, Hôpital Militaire d'Abidjan) and to Muslim prisoners at the Maison d'arrêt et de correction d'Abidjan (MACA). Given the scope of the initiatives undertaken and the lack of financial resources, the directors of the association decided to transform it into an NGO in 2000. It collaborated with Imam Bridji (the official imam of MACA) in providing training to Muslim prisoners and raising their awareness of Islamic practices. It also took responsibility for the care of prisoners following their release.

The first wave of locally initiated Islamic NGOs in the 1990s seems to have been tied to the processes of democratisation. But more broadly, the creation of such NGOs can hardly be reduced to a by-product of democratisation, since the number of Islamic NGOs and their presence in society increased most significantly after the military crisis of 2002. It was really only after 2005 that locally initiated NGOs really came into their own. Indeed, as the political and military crisis persisted and state resources became depleted, NGOs were needed to mobilise financing and other resources to complete various local development projects. Thus, NGOs primarily developed between 2005 and 2010 in response to the military and political crisis, with its numerous displaced persons and rising poverty. At the turn of the twenty-first century, only two Islamic NGOs were recognised by the Ministry of the Interior: Secours médical islamique (SEMI), created in 1994, and the Association de bienfaisance islamique de Côte d'Ivoire, founded in 2001. Between 2006 and 2009, the Ministry of the Interior recognised the existence and authorised the activities of nine new Islamic NGOs. The armed confrontations and the hardening positions between the forces of Laurent Gbagbo and the Forces nouvelles greatly affected the inhabitants of Côte d'Ivoire and many of them sought refuge in the government-controlled zone in the hope of finding assistance and security, following the example of populations in certain Arab countries (Ben Néfissa et al. 2004: 12) or those affected by the armed conflict in northern Mali (Raghavan 1992). Consequently, the dynamism of Ivorian Islamic NGOs was linked to the military and political crisis and to different initiatives introduced by the Côte d'Ivoire government, by other states, and by international agencies to help displaced populations, as well as to reintegrate militarised youth. For instance, in the city of Bouaké in 2008, in light of programmes aimed at national reintegration and the rehabilitation of armed youth, a number of neighbourhood- or mosque- based Muslim women's associations were in the process of creating NGOs.⁶ They hoped to finance local projects linked to the peace process.

In Burkina Faso, the emergence and development of Islamic associations was strongly linked to two main factors. First, there were the various conflicts that occurred within the Communauté musulmane du Burkina Faso (CMBF) between the two main tendencies of the Sufi brotherhood of the Tijaniyya Hamawliyya, and among the Salafis of the Mouvement sunnite (Dao 1991; Kouanda 1989; Savadogo 1990, 1996). Second, there was the search for increased visibility by the Burkina Faso Muslims within a context of increasing political openness and freedom of expression (Oubda 2004;

Ouédraogo 2000). Furthermore, in an attempt to respond to successive droughts (Michael 2004: 92; Raghavan 1992), other NGOs had emerged during the 1970s. As for national Islamic NGOs, they were mainly created between 2000 and 2010. There was the *Fondation de solidarité et d'aide au peuple africain (FOSAPA)*, recognised as a national NGO in August 2008,⁷ as well as the *Fondation Abdallah Ben Massoud* and the *Fondation Cheikh Aoréma*, both created in 2003.⁸ Only *At-Tarbiya Al-Islamiya* was older, dating from 1995. The creation of these national NGOs was the result of the dynamism of their founders who created social networks involving Islamic associations like the *CMBF*, the *Mouvement sunnite* and the *Tijaniyya*,⁹ as well as the Gulf countries, in order to mobilise assistance to populations in need. Relations with the Gulf countries were developed to such an extent that the Arab countries considered Burkina Faso a prime country to invest in socially. Although Muslims constituted a demographic majority, they were socioeconomically under-represented and therefore they needed to be organised and supported by Islamic NGOs.

In fact, the profile of the founders and leaders of NGOs confirms the empirical evidence presented above regarding the context in which locally initiated Islamic NGOs were created. Within each of the three national contexts discussed in this chapter, Islamic activists were generally drawn from the associational context rather than having professional backgrounds in international development.¹⁰ The large majority of the founders and leaders of NGOs in all three countries were highly educated relative to the general population, having attended either French- or Arabic-speaking institutions of higher education. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, Cissé Djiguiha, the founder and director of the *Fondation Djigui la grande espérance*,¹¹ was the head imam of the *Grande mosquée du Plateau* and vice-president of the *CNI*. He was also one of the founders of the *Association des élèves et étudiants musulmans de Côte d'Ivoire (AEEMCI)* and actively participated in the mobilisation of Muslim students around the deepening of their faith and the daily practice of their religion. He received some Islamic religious training in the public educational institutions of Abidjan (*Lycée Sainte Marie*, *Lycée Classique d'Abidjan*) along with Ali Yoda, a television journalist in Côte d'Ivoire, host of the *Allahou Akbar* TV programme and one of the founding members of the *AEEMCI*. They were supported by their elders, including Aboubakar Fofana who is head of the *COSIM* and Tidjane Ba, who was the president of the *Communauté musulmane de la Riviéra* and the Imam of the *Grande Mosquée* of the *Riviéra Golfe*. Cissé was educated in Western French-

speaking secular schools, and then in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.¹² The profile and career trajectories of female leaders were similar to those of their male counterparts.¹³ For instance, *ONG Sauvetage* was created in 2005 by Aïcha Cissé. Ms Cissé holds a graduate degree in administration, which she received from the *Université de Côte d'Ivoire*. Since the late 1990s, she has been very involved in local and national Islamic associations, and she is married to an imam who plays a key role at the *COSIM*.¹⁴

In Senegal, Ciré Iy¹⁵ attended the *École Blanchot*, a French school in Saint-Louis, before being admitted to the *École William-Ponty* and later pursuing medical studies. The founder of the *Association musulmane des étudiants d'Afrique Noire*,¹⁶ he served as secretary of the association's Paris branch from 1955 to 1957. In 1961, he was the first medical doctor to defend a thesis in Dakar. He was well-respected in the Islamic associational sector for his past and more recent political activism, and for the many public positions he took as a citizen based on the foundations of Muslim values. Bamar Gueye, the executive director of *Jamra*, came from a prominent *Lebou* family in the *Cap Vert* region known for its political positions and its Islamic political activism under the strict rule of his father, *Abbas Gueye*, and one of his brothers, *Latif Gueye*.¹⁷

In Burkina Faso, *Aboubacar Doukouré* received a doctorate in Islamic law at the age of 36. He reorganised the *zawiya* in *Hamdallaye* and consolidated the 'gains' made by his father, *Abdoulaye Podé*, whom he succeeded, by emphasising the modernisation of the *zawiya*. Thus, he had the *Institut Al Ilm* built and outfitted thanks to the assistance of his network of relations in Saudi Arabia, in addition to a sanitary network.¹⁸ But because of his responsibility for the *zawiya*, his role in social services became more limited. As he stated: 'If they need a helping hand, I am available and interested in helping them. I mainly serve as an intermediary between the state and the organisation.'¹⁹ As a result, the NGO has been managed by *Gaber Abd Al-Hamid Hamouda* since January 2010. Trained as an accountant, the latter studied economics in Egypt and in the secular education system. *Adama Aoréma Ouédraogo*, founder and director of the *Fondation Cheikh Aoréma*, studied Arabic in Burkina Faso, Mali (at the secondary level, from 1968 to 1974) and in Mauritania. He opened various schools between 1985 and 1995.²⁰ In 1995, he created the *Association At-Tarbiya Al-Islamiya*, which evolved into the foundation *Sheikh Aoréma* in 2003. *El Hadj Issouf Kanazoé*, founder and secretary general of the national NGO *Fondation Abdallah Ben Massoud*, followed an even more interesting career path. Born in Khartoum, he studied the

Quran for five years and then the *hadiths*. Upon his return to Burkina Faso at the age of 15, he studied in his free time but his primary occupation was as a poultry merchant. Through his commercial activities, he became the owner of buildings and houses, and oversaw the construction of mosques and *madrasas*. He had the idea of creating a first association with Moussa Compaoré, and then decided, upon the death of the latter and believing that this first institution was not working well, to create the Fondation Abdallah Ben Massoud.²¹

Finally, Islamic NGOs in the three countries share a common logic for establishing themselves in urban centres around existing Islamic structures, such as schools and mosques. Granted, in Burkina Faso, there seems to be a relatively well-balanced distribution of NGOs in urban and rural areas. This implies a balance between, on the one hand, traditional rural development projects focused on hydraulics, agriculture, breeding and the environment; and, on the other, social and educational projects. But the majority of NGOs have been established in the political and economic capitals of the countries where they are active. In Senegal, they are centralised in Dakar or in other cities, such as Kaolack and Touba, which are centres of activity for the Islamic brotherhoods. In Côte d'Ivoire, they are mainly located in Abidjan or, in the case of NGOs created between 2002 and 2010, in Bouaké.

Furthermore, the Islamic NGOs have emerged alongside already established organisations. For example, the Fondation Ben Massoud was set up near the Al Houda radio station in the Ouaga 2000 neighbourhood. This was also the case for the Fondation Cheikh Aoréma in Ouagadougou, which is located within the educational institution founded by Cheikh Aoréma and from which the NGO emerged. In Abidjan, several Islamic NGOs are located near the offices of the COSIM in Treichville neighbourhood, in mosques and in Islamic schools. The NGO ASI and the International Islamic Relief Organisation are located behind the Islamic centre at the Patte d'Oie in Dakar. Others still are situated on important urban thoroughfares: the FOSAPA along Tansoaba Boulevard in Ouagadougou and Jamra along Bourguiba Avenue in Dakar. The visibility of the NGOs also affects how they are perceived, and locating an association's office in a financial or upper-class neighbourhood can provide it with greater legitimacy. Consequently, the registered address of an NGO's offices does not necessarily correspond to the neighbourhood or region where it is active.

Ambivalent Relations Between Islamic NGOs and the State

This chapter looks beyond a normative analysis that treats NGOs solely as components of civil society, and according to which they enjoy complete autonomy relative to the state. In practice, the reality appears much more complex, with states and NGOs having complementary interests which inevitably influence the logic of their relationships.

First, it is important to emphasise that the national context has a significant influence on the measures taken by different states with regard to the status of Islamic NGOs. In Senegal, the presence of an extremely centralised state left very little room for the development of informal NGOs, whereas in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire there was a notable absence of legal difficulties when it came to the recognition of NGOs. In Côte d'Ivoire, the lack of centralisation can be explained by the recent political and military crisis that accounts, in part, for the state's incapacity or unwillingness to control the status of NGOs. In 2011, while we were conducting field research in Abidjan, it seemed that the new national government led by Dramane Alassane Ouattara was trying to apply the existing rules more strictly and to formalise the status of those associational structures whose status was ambiguous. Since that time, organisations in Côte d'Ivoire have had to apply to the Direction des affaires générales, an agency of the Ministry of State, to obtain legal status and to give the following information: the current status of the NGO, a description of its internal by-laws, a signed and notarised document with the list of people attending its general assembly, a list of the members of the board of directors (the '*bureau*'). NGOs in Côte d'Ivoire do not need to provide a financial statement. It should also be noted that locally initiated NGOs are given the status of associations in this country and that, consequently, there is little to differentiate associations from NGOs.

In Burkina Faso:

the legislation in place, that is Law Number 10/92/ADP of 15 December 1992 dealing with freedom of association, does not establish a separate category for the NGOs. In fact, it makes absolutely no mention of NGOs and thus creates vagueness around the status of these entities. [...] As a result, the concept and the category of 'NGO' has no legal existence. [...] [For a national NGO], the application for recognition must include the following elements: a request for recognition addressed to the *Directeur du Bureau de Suivi des ONG (DSONG)*; the receipt of the declaration

of corporate existence, commonly called the receipt of recognition ('*récépissé de reconnaissance*'), issued by the Ministry of Territorial Administration; the association's internal by-laws; the minutes of the founding assembly with the names and addresses of the representatives; a report of activities for the last two years. (Ibriga 1998: 503-4)

In Senegal, NGOs are often extensions of religious associations, the result of a 1996 governmental decree whereby applications have to be processed by the Ministry of Social Development and National Solidarity. Applications have to include a receipt of declaration, proof that the NGO is an offshoot of an association that has been officially recognised for at least two years, two copies of the association's status, a list of its members and of the members of the board of directors (including first and last names, address, age, nationality, professional status and position), and a memorandum describing the organisation and all of its activities and projects. Once it is granted legal status, an NGO has to provide a bi-annual financial statement.

More recently, aside from their official recognition by the state, Islamic NGOs have also sought to structure their activities within networks and under umbrella associations. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, the COSIM has 16 subcommittees, one of which, named the Department of Civil Society,²⁷ is responsible for identifying Islamic associations and NGOs with which the organisation might collaborate. The assistant to the director of this department has expressed his hope that it will facilitate links with local Islamic NGOs, international ones, and the Ivorian state. In October 2011, the COSIM's list of potential partners included over 150 NGOs and officially recognised a total of 22 Islamic NGOs.²⁸ In Burkina Faso, according to our field research, Islamic NGOs do not seem to have joined forces. Some have held informal meetings, but without any real follow-up or intention to establish an official structure. The Fondation Aoréma appears to be the only one affiliated with the Secrétariat permanent des ONG (SPONG), 'the first private structure for coordinating non-governmental activity, created in 1975 on the initiative of 17 NGOs' (Ibriga 1998: 509). The foundation's participation is noted on the website of the SPONG²⁹ and has been confirmed by Sheikh Ouédraogo.²⁸ The situation in Senegal is similar to that observed in Burkina Faso. Islamic NGOs there show no enthusiasm for collaboration, and even express distrust at the idea of affiliating with the Conseil des ONG d'appui au développement au Sénégal (CONGAD), seeking instead to maximise their freedom of action

(Gomez-Perez 2011; Renders 2002). However, there exists a Réseau des ONG Islamiques which does not appear, according to our observations, to be very active; it has spoken out a few times on very specific questions, as we discuss below.

Despite the fact that none of the three states is particularly concerned with the criteria for officially recognising Islamic NGOs, organisations in all three countries have succeeded in undertaking social initiatives seeking to improve the living conditions of the poorer classes. Urban NGOs have targeted five main fields of activity: public health (health care, health consultations, patient visits, distribution of medicine, hygiene awareness and female circumcision); social issues such as family welfare and prisoners' and children's rights; charitable activities, such as the donation of ablution kettles and prayer mats, the construction of latrines in mosques, the distribution of food to needy families during religious festivals,³⁶ and emergency assistance during natural disasters and social conflicts (in the case of the Fonds sénégalais de solidarité islamique, FSSI);³⁷ economic development projects involving drilling for water and the construction of wells; educational projects, including centres for Arabic- and French-language literacy, measures to lower drop-out rates among students,³⁸ Islamic schooling, vocational training (for example, the training of seamstresses), the distribution of scholarships, the recruitment of teachers to promote the teaching of Arabic,³⁹ and the distribution of school supplies.

It appears that national NGOs are distinguished first of all by the will of a small group of people to improve their community with educational and health activities. This is the case with the Fondation Cheikh Aoréma in Ouagadougou, which cares for orphans, promotes awareness of hygiene measures and the fight against female circumcision. Aoréma is the name of the village where Sheikh Adama Aoréma Ouédraogo was born and he himself lost his father at a young age.³⁰ This is also the case with Ciré Ly at the ASI, who has led activities in the region of his birth, the region of Podor in Senegal, and with Jamra, which became known from the start for its activities related to organising campaigns against drugs, as well as for AIDS and malaria prevention. In Côte d'Ivoire, one of the oldest Islamic NGOs, Al Muwassat, located inside the mosque of the CHU in Treichville, has a long history of charitable work in that hospital and more recently in other hospitals in the country. At first, its members assisted with the everyday care of patients, such as providing the paediatrics department with syringes and other medical equipment. More recently, it has been involved in providing toys to sick children. The Fondation Djiugu has been

involved in the struggles against female circumcision and the spread of HIV/AIDS through a number of educational media campaigns. Since the first efforts at national reconciliation in 2006, these larger national NGOs have moved into peace-building and post-war reconstruction activities, such as women's reproductive health, the socio-sanitary consequences of rape, care of orphans and vulnerable children, and socioeconomic reintegration of militarised youth.

The vast majority of Islamic NGOs that we discuss are financed by the monetary contributions of their members; fundraising activities such as social events or campaigns, individual donations and gifts or bequests. Most locally initiated NGOs are self-financed, which helps to explain why, even though the number of organisations is increasing, only a few of them have been particularly active and capable of carrying out larger projects.³¹ Aside from individual fundraising activities, our research points to partnerships with international and transnational NGOs, and partnerships with the state used to finance their activities. Transnational and international organisations can initiate projects capable of generating revenues by allowing the opening of trade centres (as in the case of Qatar Charity);³² by distributing the means of production, such as sewing machines or livestock; and by giving priority to the financing of schools, orphanages and health centres. Qatar Charity appears to have been one of the only NGOs to use an assistance-to-development approach when it launched a project for the installation of wells with pulleys that allow four women to collect water at the same time.³³ Furthermore, transnational Islamic NGOs generally act through local NGOs to implement such charitable activities,³⁴ which are financed by donations from Muslims. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, the medical consultations provided by SEMI and the medicine it distributes have benefited from financing from the Association des cadres musulmans de Côte d'Ivoire, as well as from the Association des hommes d'affaires musulmans. The Fondation Djigui has received financial and material support from Lebanese Muslims and the Association Al Ghadir. The latter is an association of mainly Shiite Lebanese Muslims. It operates a school in Riviera M'pouto, an imposing mosque in the residential neighbourhood of Marcory, and a medical centre. It has maintained a presence in Côte d'Ivoire since the end of the 1980s and it has worked mainly in the social and educational sectors. In 2011, it launched a programme in support of audiovisual expression by Muslims.

Some of these NGOs have also benefited from government grants and worked in collaboration with the state. They have attempted to complement

the latter's programmes by targeting poorer populations in urban neighbourhoods with significant social needs, as well as rural populations in need of development projects and improvements to the conditions of everyday life. Some NGOs, more successful at raising funds and receiving national recognition, have managed to participate in activities organised by major international humanitarian and development agencies. Jamra has participated in the international conference on the prevention and the control of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, held in 1994 in Burkina Faso and organised by the World Bank, and in the international AIDS conference held in Morocco in 2001. In October 2005, it participated in a workshop aimed at creating a global campaign concerning AIDS and children, organised by the UN Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). In Côte d'Ivoire, since 2011, Islamic NGOs have had more opportunities to get involved in activities surrounding the work of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, initiated either by the Ivorian government or by international agencies such as the World Bank or the United Nations (UN). In November 2011, ONG Sauvetage was invited to attend two days of UN training on national reconciliation models organised by the Commission.³⁵ The same NGO and a few others were invited to the World Bank conference on child labour organised in October 2011³⁶ to participate in or observe training sessions and discussion groups. These activities, despite their visibility, have not translated into concrete projects or brought the funds necessary to initiate such projects.

Despite the recent focus on good governance by international agencies that finance international and national development projects and programmes (Marcussen 1998), it seems that Islamic NGOs in Senegal and Burkina Faso do not, at least officially, address issues of democracy and the consolidation of civil society. By contrast, in Côte d'Ivoire, some locally initiated Islamic NGOs have been involved in both issues since the 2011 presidential elections and the setting up of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. During the 2011 presidential elections and the 2012 legislative elections, NGOs such as Sauvetage trained observers and dispatched them across the country to witness the voting process.³⁷ Jamra, upon seeing the increase in tensions before the presidential elections in Senegal, led a delegation to the principal religious authorities and to the candidates for the presidential elections of 26 February 2012³⁸ in an attempt to 'ensure social stability and civil peace, regardless of the intensity of political rivalries'.³⁹

The apparent lack of interest in issues relating to democracy and the consolidation of civil society can be explained by the ambivalent relationship that Islamic NGOs maintain with the state in each of the three countries. Furthermore, this ambivalence reflects the relationship between the state and the associational sector. While the Islamic NGOs we have studied are not extensions of national political parties, as seems to be the case in Ghana (Mumuni 2002), nor do they carry out the political project of the state as in post-1989 Sudan (Bentham and Bellton-Jourdan 2003: 127), there is a clear alignment between the state apparatus and legally recognised national Islamic NGOs. In Senegal and Burkina Faso, associations are closely tied to the state apparatus but not necessarily to any specific political party, particularly since the so-called wave of democratic elections in the 1990s. Since 1988, Jamra has worked in close collaboration with the Ministry of the Family and the Conseil national de lutte contre le Sida. The state is conscious of the fact that Islamic NGOs like Jamra are 'intermediaries' that cannot be ignored and which help ensure the success of large prevention campaigns (Delaunay 1998; Gomez-Perez 2011), insofar as these NGOs have spent several decades building relationships of confidence with all of the *khalifs* of the different Muslim brotherhoods and the latter have been invited to become involved in the fight against AIDS. Furthermore, the lobbying efforts of these NGOs have led to a hardening of drug trafficking laws and, in 2003, they participated in parliamentary sessions aimed at reforming legislation related to AIDS.⁴⁰

In Burkina Faso, projects have also been undertaken in collaboration with the state. While cooperation between the state and the country's Christian churches has existed since the colonial era, cooperation with Islamic NGOs is in the process of being consolidated. Different political and social crises have reinforced cooperation with the Christian NGOs, which have become powerful 'substitutes' for the state in both rural and urban areas. Thus, upon the visit of Pope John Paul II to Burkina Faso in 1981, the Fondation pour le Sahel was created to assist with rural development and notably the fight against drought. Likewise, the Centre ophtalmologique Jean-Paul II in Ouagadougou was created, dedicated to assisting poor patients. Despite cooperation between the state and Islamic NGOs being a more recent phenomenon, some associations, such as the Fondation Cheikh Aouèma, have established links with the state to such an extent that Aouèma Ouédraogo was awarded the *Ordre national* by President Compaoré. Due to the limited financial means of locally

initiated Islamic NGOs in Burkina Faso, cooperation between the state and NGOs has mainly involved transnational NGOs.

While the state has tended to collaborate more easily with Christian NGOs,⁴¹ the attitude of Islamic NGOs in post-2002 Côte d'Ivoire helps illustrate their dependency on state initiatives. In 2008, in Bouaké, groups of Islamic NGOs discussed potential projects.⁴² One of them was a project for the social reintegration of armed youth, but the Islamic NGOs' leaders preferred to wait for state initiatives such as the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) National Reintegration Programme before proceeding. First, the disarmament initiative required significant financial and material resources that exceeded the means of the NGOs and, second, social reintegration is a long process requiring the mobilisation of qualified personnel and adequate material resources. In October 2011,⁴³ a number of female-led NGOs in Abidjan expressed an interest in getting involved with issues pertaining to the abuse of women within the context of the post-presidential conflict of 2010 and 2011. However, they decided to wait for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission to prepare a plan of action before initiating their own projects and requesting funding. The NGO leaders felt that they were not structured enough yet to proceed.

Although Islamic NGOs act largely as social intermediaries that the state cannot afford to ignore, they still exercise some degree of freedom of action and can be critical towards some government measures. For example, Bamar Guèye insists on the fact that Jamra must not participate in partisan battles in order to preserve its freedom of action and to remain credible on the ground. He states that the organisation's non-political character was always the subject of animated discussions with his brother Latif, who led the *Rassemblement démocratique sénégalais* from May 2000 until his accidental death in 2008, and who would have liked a stronger connection between his political activities (he was elected as a representative in June 2007) and the NGO's social initiatives.⁴⁴ However, the Islamic NGOs' non-political character does not mean that they do not participate in political debates. Jamra has managed to address taboo subjects such as prostitution, rape, incest and homosexuality. Its most aggressive campaign was launched in 2009, targeting homosexuals and state policies considered too accommodating of this sexual orientation, which the NGO considered to be an expression of 'deviance'. It was on the initiative of the *Front islamique pour la défense des valeurs éthiques contre l'homosexualité* that Jamra helped raise awareness of the issue

among the leaders of the Tijaniyya and Mouride brotherhoods, in order to pressure the Senegalese state not to sign the proposed convention for the decriminalisation of homosexuality, presented to the UN by Rama Yade, the French Secretary of State for Human Rights.

Moreover, the Réseau des ONG Islamiques in Dakar made a declaration in January 2010 to express regret that the project for the erection of a monument to the African Renaissance was not 'submitted for the approval of the people or of their competent institutions before its implementation'.⁴⁵ The ASI, along with more than 140 civil society organisations, participated in the Assises Nationales (National Forum) to discuss the state of society and politics in Senegal, to render an account of poor governance in the country and to call for a 'new vision of society' founded on 'ethics, participatory democracy, dialogue, the respect of institutions and of individual and collective liberties'.⁴⁶ Such participation in politically sensitive state initiatives raises questions about the more religious activities of these organisations and their proselytising overtones.

Humanitarian Jihad, Indirect Dawah or Conciliation Strategy?

One of the central issues addressed in the literature on Islamic NGOs is their relationship to recent processes of Islamisation and, for some authors like Ghandour (2002), to jihadism. These three countries discussed in this chapter do not fit the model of open proselytism and the increased radicalism of Muslim communities documented in the literature. There is a clear link between the development of Islam, its search for visibility in the national public sphere, and the emergence of Islamic NGOs. But the activities of these organisations, most notably in the religious domain (training, information, prayer room equipment), really have nothing in common with Jihadism. Furthermore, while Muslim values and practices have been central to the majority of the activities undertaken by Islamic NGOs in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, their scope has remained very local.

Although Muslims are the primary targets of some projects pertaining to education, the Islamic NGOs being studied do not cater exclusively to Muslims. The sphere of action of these NGOs is not the *Ummah* but rather the *Nahda* (Bellion-Jourdan 1997: 119). This implies a reform of the local, immediate community rather than aspirations to a global conversion to Islam. None of the NGOs we studied have engaged in projects that focused on Muslims outside of their immediate local or national sphere,

such as the restoration or construction of mosques in other countries, or sending copies of the Quran abroad. For instance, when Islamic NGOs have embarked on fundraising drives in Côte d'Ivoire, they have generally addressed the needs of a specific neighbourhood, such as the acquisition of prayer mats for a local mosque or scholarships for poor children. For example, ONG Sauvetage introduced a scholarship programme where ten children were chosen in Koumassi, a poor neighbourhood in Abidjan, on the basis of their families' economic situation. Each child was assigned a sponsor who provided the equivalent of US\$20 a month for a period of one year.⁴⁷

In fact, our research seems to confirm that the underlying discursive logic of most Islamic NGOs is a complex combination of religious values and dominant Western-based rational discourses on modernisation. Indeed, the centrality of humanitarian activities to these NGOs enhances their capacity to combine what were once seen as incompatible discourses, namely local religious values and Western ideals of modernity. Jamra emphasises the notion of an 'enlightened' Islam, one that can easily extend its religious discourse to connect with scientific knowledge and practical experience. In the case of the AIDS awareness campaign led by Jamra, emphasis was not only placed on the proper training of its representatives but also on proper coordination with other actors, while respecting each one's individual identity, an approach reflected in professionalism and efficiency on the ground. Jamra's personnel were trained by physicians specialising in AIDS to learn the causes of the emergence of the pandemic and the factors of contamination. At the same time, Jamra, with the valuable help of imams and other religious leaders who were trained in communication techniques necessary to assist and support local populations, called for changes in behaviour in keeping with the precepts of the Quran and the *Sunna* (fidelity and abstinence), which could be described as a 'moral condom'; this was in contrast to national AIDS campaigns involving the distribution of actual condoms. Other Islamic NGOs active in the prevention of HIV/AIDS and female circumcision, such as Eden Lumière-Action and the Fondation Djigui in Côte d'Ivoire, adopted similar approaches and tried to alleviate the perceived tension between Islamic religious values and the Western-based secular ideals of liberty and equality. The same could be said of Islamic NGOs active in the field of health. For instance, SEMI and Al Muwassat, two of the main Ivorian Islamic NGOs involved in supporting and providing health care services,

do not discriminate between Muslims and non-Muslims and they claim to provide services to populations in need. Furthermore, their actions are embedded within an effort to build an awareness of professionalism that draws on scientific expertise and not exclusively on religious knowledge. The training and dispatching of electoral observers by ONG Sauvetage in 2011 and 2012 fits the same pattern. The NGO used both government resources and those available on the internet to create a training package for observers that in no way reflected religious discourses or engaged in proselytism.⁴⁸ And while the director of the NGO claimed that she was doing her 'duty as a good Muslim', she was clearly able to understand that duty in national, civic and moral terms – that is, terms that echoed the ideals of democracy supported by the logic of 'good governance' promoted by international institutions much more than jihadist ideals.

Although activities remained anchored within the local context, the holding of a summit by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Dakar in March 2008 served as an occasion for Senegalese Islamic NGOs to demand their place within the *Ummah*. Thus, the ASI organised a workshop in Saly Portudal on 7–8 March 2008 in order to discuss the role and place of NGOs in the activities of the OIC, to push for the OIC to officially recognise the role NGOs within its ten-year plan and, finally, to create a network among the NGOs of the Muslim world and also between them and the OIC. Given the striking absence of Islamic NGOs participating in international humanitarian campaigns when compared to Western institutions, the ASI concluded that it was 'urgent to develop a model of the NGO based on the precepts of the Holy Quran and of the Sunna'⁴⁹ in order to respond to the needs and aspirations of the populations of Muslim countries. It was also necessary to reform the OIC in order to strengthen relations between that organisation and NGOs, 'given the important place occupied by civil society and Islamic NGOs in the promotion and spread of the moral and religious values of Islam'.⁵⁰ Finally, it was pressing that the OIC acquire 'before the world, a moral authority such that it will be able to play its natural role of defence against the slander directed at Islam, especially from Western contexts'.⁵¹ With these words, it is clear that the primary objective is to address the *Ummah* and to work for its cohesiveness by emphasising the institutional aspect and the under-representation of civil society within the decision-making bodies of the OIC.

Moreover, Islamic NGOs in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire have engaged in different forms of collaboration with other religious groups. In some cases, these collaborative efforts stem from a desire to foster

inter-religious dialogue.⁵² In particular, this has been the case within the context of peace-building in Côte d'Ivoire, where, since the electoral and military crisis of April 2011, attempts at fostering a sense of inter-religious reconciliation and cohesion have significantly increased. A number of Islamic NGOs have participated in interfaith gatherings, such as the large event organised by women in Abobo neighbourhood in Abidjan in July.⁵³ In most cases, however, the motivation to engage in inter-religious dialogue is rooted in a pragmatic vision of how to bring together different partners so as to increase the success of social projects. For instance, within the context of a highly publicised campaign against female circumcision launched in Abidjan in March 2008, the Fondation Djigui invited a priest, a pastor, the president of a women lawyers' association and women active in Islamic associations to participate in a debate that was largely secular in nature. Similarly, within the context of a national campaign against AIDS in Senegal, Jamra invited members of the Catholic clergy to help organise a conference in 1996. According to Jamra leaders, strategies of religious reconciliation lead to opportunities such as participation in international meetings, and allow them to gain legitimacy at an international level (Ghandour 2002: 221). Furthermore, the Réseau des ONG islamiques very clearly condemned Abdoulaye Wade's comments against the Church on 28 December 2009, and praised the responsible attitude of the Church in reminding its followers of the foundations of the Christian creed and in appealing for calm.

Conclusion

In light of the historical continuity between Islamic NGOs and voluntary Islamic associations in West Africa, the evidence presented in this chapter points to a rethinking of the role of NGOs as the guarantors of civil society within the context of democratisation and economic crises. Furthermore, the NGOs discussed here certainly do not have a clearly defined relationship with the state. They are neither fully incorporated into state programmes nor do they act as watchdogs for state abuses. According to our research, in some cases, Islamic NGOs have responded positively to government and international programmes, thus embracing their important role as intermediaries. In other cases, they have become involved in public debates and put pressure on the state to adopt new social policies (as is the case of Senegal; see Gomez-Perez 2011). Within this context, there has been

strong competition among fbNGOs to gain visibility and legitimacy in the eyes of international authorities and local states.

It is clear that Islamic NGOs in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso have adopted a hybrid discourse, integrating both religious values and modern, scientific ones. They have also manifested an ambivalent posture towards both religious orthodoxy and religious openness, as well as towards opponents and supporters. Ultimately, the distinction proposed by Jonathan Benthall (2007: 116) between Muslim NGOs and Islamic NGOs (In light of NGOs in Southeast Asia) in which the former generally display secular orientations while the latter tend to orient their actions towards the application of different religious principles in view of an Islamist political project, might not be so rigid. The boundaries between 'open proselytism' and the promotion of humanitarian aid may turn out to be quite porous and, as shown here, this also depends on funding conditions and the capacity on the part of smaller locally initiated Islamic NGOs to respond to the standards of professionalisation required by external funders.

3

Muslim NGOs in Côte d'Ivoire

Towards an Islamic Culture of Charity

Issouf Binaté

Introduction

In recent years, Muslim community organisations in Côte d'Ivoire have undergone a process of revitalisation. In particular, Muslim non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have become a fixture in the public sphere. While working to reduce the vulnerability of the Muslim population, these organisations have also helped bridge gaps in public services – especially in the fields of education and health – left by a state coming to grips with a serious socio-political crisis. Whereas the Christian community has a long history of institutions that structure civic engagement in charitable activities, Muslim NGOs might appear to have simply burst onto the scene (Desalmand 1983; N'Datten 2008). In fact, scholars trace the origins of the phenomenon to the early 1980s, when Arab countries in the midst of an oil boom developed a growing interest in using some of their windfalls to support the development of disadvantaged Muslim communities around the world (Bellion-Jourdan 2001; Chanfi 2009; Kaag 2008; LeBlanc et al. 2013; Mattes 1993; Rabiati 2007; Sadouni 2009; Sallh 2002; Soares and Otayek 2007; Sounaye 2011; Weiss 2000). Motivated by feelings of Islamic solidarity and the religious obligation of *dawah*, as well as the principles of *zakat* and *sadaqah*,¹ Arab donors provided assistance to certain African countries with a Muslim majority (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Chad), as well as some with a Muslim minority (South Africa, Kenya). Meanwhile, other countries were left to their own devices. These included Côte d'Ivoire, especially during the socio-political crises that marked the turn of the twenty-first century.

The unprecedented conflict that broke out on the night of 18–19 September 2002 caused deaths, property damage and the partition of

Notes

1. Introduction

1. Interview with Fatl, Muslim association activist (Ouagadougou, 7 March 2011). Workers, volunteers and local activists and organisations are identified by pseudonyms throughout the book. However, the real names of leaders and public figures are generally used, in accordance with the various ethical guidelines of the institutions involved (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [SSHRC], Université du Québec à Montréal, Université Laval, École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Université Alassane Ouattara, Université de Cocody).
2. Interview with the board of the Ouagadougou EPB youth association (Ouagadougou, 11 May 2010).
3. Observed at a Catholic parish youth association's general assembly (Ouagadougou, 16 January 2011).
4. NGOs that are either affiliated to a religious institution or at least partly defined by religious faith. While most scholars use the term 'faith-based organisations' (FBOs), we prefer to distinguish between organisations that specifically identify as NGOs (faith-based NGOs) and other kinds of religious institutions that can also be described as FBOs.
5. By 'actors', we refer to both individuals and groups involved in collective actions.
6. This policy has been actively promoted in Côte d'Ivoire by President Alassane Ouattara, a former IMF executive, since his election in 2011. The Burkinabe government has also strongly promoted entrepreneurship as a tool for development and youth employment since the early twenty-first century (Audet Gosselin 2013).
7. This is the shared currency of several West African countries. It is indexed to the euro, at the rate of €1 for CFA francs 656. As of 17 March 2016, US\$1 was worth CFA 579, £1 was worth CFA 839 and CA\$1 was worth CFA 446.
8. 'Côte d'Ivoire', World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/cote-divoire#cp_wdi, consulted on 9 March 2016.
9. 'Burkina Faso', World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/burkina-faso>, consulted on 9 March 2016.
10. Ibid.
11. In contrast to followers of 'revealed' religions, self-identified practitioners of 'traditional' or 'animist' faiths have very little institutional presence and have been left out of this study. However, see Beucher (2008) for an account of a traditional chief's activities in development.
12. This book makes reference to 'Evangelical' movements to describe the Churches that emerged out of the successive 'revivals' among North American and

European Protestant communities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, most of these Churches stem from the Pentecostal branch of Evangelicalism, which grew out of the 1906 Azusa Street Revival in Los Angeles. Boundaries between Evangelical denominations are in constant flux, and most Ivorian and Burkinabe Evangelicals identify as 'Protestants'. Older, more institutionalised 'mainline' Protestant Churches have very little presence in these countries. Therefore, non-Evangelical Protestant Churches are left out of this study, although research on the Ivorian Methodist Church would certainly be worthwhile.

13. The 'Dioula region' refers to the traditional territory of Dioula traders, including the centres of Khorogo and Kong (Launay 1992; Werthmann 2012). The term 'Dioula' also refers to one of the vernacular languages in Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, which was historically the market language. It also commonly used to refer to people from northern Côte d'Ivoire – a pan-ethnic group that includes migrants from countries to the north as well as Muslims in general (Launay 2013; LeBlanc 2000).

2. Reflections on the Socio-political Roles of Islamic NGOs in West Africa

1. When we began the field research involved in this project, Côte d'Ivoire was still ruled by the political regime of Laurent Gbagbo and the country was effectively divided between two zones: the region south of the city of Yamoussoukro that was ruled by the Gbagbo government and the region north of the city of Yamoussoukro that was under the control of the Forces nouvelles led by Guillaume Soro. In this context, the city of Bouaké played the role of the capital city for the northern region.
2. 'For [Islamist movements] that are more engaged, the Islamisation of society should be the result of an action not only religious, but also social, political and economic. One had to get out of the mosque, form pressure groups and act like true social agents. This is how it is possible to Islamicise institutions and the lives of Muslims!' (Ghandour 2002: 63, our translation)
3. Interview with a member of the executive committee (Dakar, 4 June 2008).
4. Interview (Dakar, 10 June 2008).
5. Koné was at the head of the CNI at the time.
6. In chapter 5, LeBlanc explores in more detail the context and the dynamics that marked Muslim women-led NGOs in the cities of Bouaké and Abidjan.
7. Interview (Ouagadougou, 14 July 2011).
8. Interviews with leaders of both NGOs (Ouagadougou, 1 August 2011 and 15 July 2011).
9. The three most visible and popular branches of Islam in Burkina Faso.
10. In chapter 6 (Couillard et al.) and chapter 8 (Vitale), the authors explore in detail different aspects of the leadership of these organisations.
11. Hereafter referred as Fondation Djigui.
12. Interview (Abidjan, 13 March 2004). For similar descriptions, see also Binaf (2005) and Miran (2006).

13. In Côte d'Ivoire, we noticed that between the time we started the empirical research in 2008 and the date of the last field research in autumn 2011, the number of Islamic NGOs created and led by women had increased.
14. Interview (Abidjan, 28 October 2011).
15. Interview (Dakar, 24 February 1994).
16. For more details, see Gomez-Perez (1997).
17. For more details, see Gomez-Perez (2011).
18. For detailed accounts of Sheikh Doukouré's work, see chapters 6 (Couillard et al.) and 8 (Vitale).
19. Interview (Ouagadougou, 17 November 2011).
20. For more details of his training path and his entrepreneurship, see chapter 6 (Couillard et al.).
21. Interview (Ouagadougou, 10 November 2011). See chapter 6 (Couillard et al.) for more information about Kanazé.
22. Interview (Abidjan, 27 October 2011).
23. Interview (Abidjan, 27 October 2011).
24. See: <http://www.spong.bf/>
25. Interview (Ouagadougou, 3 November 2011).
26. Especially during Ramadan and the Eid.
27. Delivery of goods for Senegalese people brought back from Mauritania in 1989.
28. See the case of FSSI.
29. The Libyan World Islamic Call Society (WICS) recruits teachers across Burkina Faso; this situation has changed with the death in 2011 of Muammar Gaddafi, who created this association.
30. Interview (Ouagadougou, 15 July 2011).
31. See chapter 3 (Binaté) for more details on these limitations.
32. Qatar Charity is a Qatari NGO founded in 1992, with close links to the ruling family of Qatar. It is very active across the Muslim world and funds a wide variety of projects, from emergency aid to schools, clinics and water access.
33. Interview with a representative of Qatar Charity (Ouagadougou, 14 July 2011).
34. For instance, Qatar Charity uses the Association Sabil-Anadja and the Association d'appel à l'Islam. Interview with a representative of Qatar Charity (Ouagadougou, 14 July 2011).
35. Participant observation (Abidjan, October 2011).
36. Participant observation (Abidjan, October 2011).
37. Interview (Abidjan, October 2011).
38. Agence de Presse Sénégal, 17 December 2011, [http://www.aps.sn/spip.php/http://aps.php?page=articles&id_article=88058](http://www.aps.sn/spip.php?http://aps.php?page=articles&id_article=88058)
39. Agence de Presse Sénégal, 17 December 2012, http://www.aps.sn/spip.php/http://aps.php?page=articles&id_article=88058. <http://www.sudonline.sn/imprimer-article.php?article=6415>
40. Interview (Dakar, 6 June 2008).
41. Chapter 4 (Audet Gosselin and Koenig) offers a good description of this privileged collaboration.
42. Group discussion (Bouaké, July 2008).
43. Group discussion organised with the COSIM (Abidjan, October 2011).
44. For details, see Gomez-Perez (2011).

45. *Action islamique*, ASI magazine (January–February 2010), p. 1.
46. *Action islamique*, ASI magazine (March–April 2009), p. 3.
47. Interview (Abidjan, 28 October 2011).
48. Interview (Abidjan, 5 November 2011).
49. *Action islamique*, ASI magazine (February–March 2008), p. 3.
50. *Action islamique*, ASI magazine (March–April 2008), p. 2.
51. *Action islamique*, ASI magazine (March–April 2008), p. 2.
52. Binaté addresses this question in more detail in chapter 3.
53. Interview (Abidjan, October 2011).

3. Muslim NGOs in Côte d'Ivoire

1. Zakat, a compulsory form of charity, is the third of the five Pillars of Islam. Along with *sadaqah* (voluntary charity), it is meant to express the piety of the donor and ensure the well-being of the Muslim community.
2. Saint-Camille de Bouaké is a centre that belongs to the Association Saint-Camille de Lellis. The latter is a lay movement created in 1983 and dedicated to caring for the mentally ill (who are often homeless), prisoners and poor in Benin and Côte d'Ivoire. It is named for Camillus de Lellis, founder of the Catholic Order of Clerks Regular, Ministers of the Infirm. The centre in Bouaké began operations in 1994.
3. The local office of the CNI is a federation of Islamic associations in Bouaké. Managed by Mahamoud Sylla, imam of the mosque located in the city's industrial area, it provides a forum for discussions between public authorities and the Muslim community.
4. SEMI was created as an association in 1992 and officially became an NGO in 1998. It brought together Muslim professionals working in the field of health care and managed two clinics in Abidjan (Miran 2006). The organisation did not subsidise fees, which were paid directly by patients.
5. Aside from Duékoué, coordination of basic social services was practically non-existent in the other towns and cities in areas under the control of the Forces nouvelles.
6. Interview with Coulibaly Sibiri (Abidjan, 18 July 2013).
7. Orphan's Smile and the CAHMCI were created in 2003. ISLAS was created in 2004.
8. Al Muwassat and the Aq-habul Kahaf Islamic Centre were created in 2002.
9. Interview with Ouattara Magama (Bouaké, 23 July 2013).
10. Interview with Koné Jakaria (Bouaké, 22 July 2013).
11. Interview with Laikoné Aboubacar (Abidjan, 6 November 2012). Interview with Touré Ahmed and Kabran Ismaël (Abidjan, 12 November 2012).
12. Through zakat and *sadaqah*, the faithful funds a reduction in the cost of medicine and medical services. For example, a consultation costs CFA francs 200 instead of CFA francs 1000, as it would in the nearby general hospital.
13. Interview (Abidjan, 18 July 2013).
14. Interview with Touré Abbas (Abidjan, 1 May 2015).
15. Interview with Moustapha Sy Yacoub (Daloa, 27 March 2008).