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Muriel Gomez-Perez

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# **The Association des Étudiants Musulmans de l'Université de Dakar<sup>1</sup> (AEMUD) between the Local and the Global: An Analysis of Discourse**

Muriel Gomez-Perez

*This article analyzes the political, social, and religious discourse of the Association des Étudiants Musulmans de l'Université de Dakar (AEMUD), and does so by analyzing its newspaper, L'Étudiant Musulman. It explores the image of Muslim identity that the association proposes by showing how this identity results from a complex and stratified ideological corpus, based on the fundamental principles and texts of Islam and on local, regional, and international political-religious contexts. It examines whether, through AEMUD's dualist interpretation of the world, the demand for another hegemonic cultural model, one based on Sharī'a, necessarily signifies the rejection of globalization and its attributes.*

## **Introduction**

At the end of the 1970s, Senegal began to see the emergence of Islamic groups like Jamaatou Ibadou Rahmane (JIR), which demanded a larger place for Islam in politics and society, on a local and an international scale. Then, during the 1980s, there appeared a more radical, militant Islam, eager to tip the scales of power in its favor (Gomez-Perez 2005b; Kane and Triaud 1998; Otayek 1993). Several associations (including Jamaatou Ibadou Rahmane in 1978 and the Organisation pour l'Action Islamique in July 1985) and newspapers (including *Études Islamiques*, in July 1979; *Djamra*, in 1983; and the first volumes of *Wal Fadji*, launched in 1984) appeared on the scene. These groups and publications attacked the secular status of the state, as well as the brotherhoods that constitute the cornerstone of Islam in Senegal. All these developments point to the possibility that the climate had evolved (Coulon 1983, 1984; Gomez-Perez 1994, 1998; Villalon 1999), even if the latter cannot rightly be described as a revolutionary (Magassouba 1985). During the same

period, a palpable religious effervescence was developing on the campus in Dakar in a context of social and economic crisis, which I discuss at greater length below: “Besides prayer, fasting came to the forefront as a symbol of Islamic identity and of the respect of the five fundamental pillars of Islam”; also, “the fight for the construction of a mosque on campus was the centrepiece of this strategy for asserting a religious presence on the university scene” (Gomez-Perez 2005a). It was in this context that the students of Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, most of whom were francophones and many of whom were studying science, founded the Association des Étudiants Musulmans de l’Université de Dakar (AEMUD), on 31 May 1984. The new organization set itself six objectives: “To purify the faith; to facilitate the practice of the religion on campus in general, and to broadcast the message of Islam in the university environment in particular; to train through general and religious teachings, physical education, and culture; to inform using all forms of media; to be socially active and promote solidarity and fraternity among Muslims; and to respond to Islam’s detractors” (Statutes of AEMUD).

With these objectives in mind, the founding members of the association clearly identified themselves as defenders of Islam. Equipped with a solid faith, they used preaching, teaching, and social action to promote the dynamism of Islam. The association undertook action on three levels: on the microlocal level, by targeting students and universities; on the national level, by targeting available media outlets to spread their political message; and on the international level, by defending the Islamic cause around the world.

In this article, my aim is not to analyze all the components of the AEMUD’s discourse (Piga 2005) as put forth in its newspaper, *L’Étudiant Musulman*. Instead, I examine the main ideas present in that discourse in order to understand, on the one hand, how the AEMUD presented a dualistic interpretation of the world and society, and on the other hand, to what extent the association proposed a new model of culture and identity. This model would synthesize the early history of Islam, with contemporary discourses of dissent within the Muslim world and with the aspirations of Senegalese society, while providing a critical external critique of modernity and globalization.<sup>2</sup>

### **The discourse of dissent: between a confrontational approach to the world and political–religious reactions to Western cultural domination**

At a first glance, the AEMUD’s newspaper describes a neatly divided world, with the West and its allies on one side and a righteous and oppressed Islamic bloc on the other. This world map is drawn in relation to a particular reading of international affairs and of the Islamic revival. This reading of the world paints Islam as an emerging force, confronted by enemies within and without the community of believers (*umma*). Such a confrontational understanding

of the world gives great prominence to the language of protest while leading the AEMUD to call for an Islamic identity that transcends the borders of individual nation-states.

*From the hypothesis of an ongoing world conspiracy to the risk of fitna*

The theory of a conspiracy against Islam is a recurring theme in the AEMUD's discourse. The association claimed that since the time of the Prophet Mohammad, Islam has been under attack from what it called the forces of Satan or those of the hypocrites. The West was portrayed as an actor that, depending on the circumstances, preaches tolerance and the defense of human rights, while adopting political positions that are prejudicial to the interests of Muslims. Thus, over the years, the number of the West's allies has grown, and with it the number of its enemies, but it is the state of Israel that remained the most important target. By taking events out of their historical contexts and processes and by presupposing that the West has always been imperialistic, intolerant, scheming, and in need of being fought against, many historical facts were brought into evidence: the slave trade, the conscription of Africans during colonial wars, and the West's support of the South African apartheid regime. The objective was to discredit the West on the international scene while applauding Muslims' actions around the world. The *Satanic Verses* affair and the AEMUD's participation in the debate surrounding the book's publication in the Islamic world—a debate that intensified following the death sentence issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini—is a case in point.<sup>3</sup> The association called Salman Rushdie an "uprooted and faithless man," and the *Satanic Verses* a blasphemous piece, to the extent that it viewed the book as "an affront on Muslim dignity and integrity."<sup>4</sup> The West, at the time of the publication of the book, was described as heretical for having defended Salman Rushdie, the author, and for having awarded him a literary prize for his work. By adopting this outlook, the association aligned itself with the other Islamic associations and newspapers cited above (Gomez-Perez 1990).

At the outset of the Gulf Crisis, the same arguments would be used against the West: this crisis not only illustrated the dichotomy between the West and the Muslim world, but led the latter, in contrast to American ultra-imperialism, to face a serious crisis, which highlighted the sudden absence of Arab solidarity. Granted, this stance largely ignored the actual chronology of events, since the end of Arab unity really dates to the 1960s (Laurens 1991). The association also neglected to mention that American supremacy was the direct result of the end of East–West conflict and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that the Middle East was directly affected by this political context (Laurens 2005a, 2005b:432–434). But the association had a clear vision of what was at play in the geopolitical and geostrategic developments emerging from the first Gulf War, especially the presence of the American army on the territory of Saudi Arabia, the epicenter of Islam. This is why the association describes Saudi Arabia, having accepted the presence of Western

and especially American troops on its soil, as having placing Islam in “great jeopardy.” The AEMUD was fully conscious that, on the one hand, the 1990s saw the birth of “a so-called ‘world’ order[,] which would nevertheless reveal itself to be increasingly ‘organised’ solely around ‘American’ interests. . . . [Hence the perception of being] faced with the advance of a kind of rampant ‘recolonisation’” (Burgat 2005:45). On the other hand, the danger of disorder or chaos (*fitna*) within the Muslim world was particularly real. Indeed, faced with the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, the Islamic movements of the period made divergent interpretations of the facts, and the AEMUD was no exception. Thus, it accused the Arab states and monarchies of the Gulf region of harming the cause of Islam by participating in the conflict on the same side as the West, because of their desire to “preserve their respective leaderships” and the fact that they “showered the powers and financial institutions of the West with petrodollars,”<sup>5</sup> yet surprisingly, the association described Saddam Hussein as the “secular megalomaniac of Baghdad, keen on a chauvinistic and bellicose Arab nationalism” for having decided to invade Kuwait. This is surprising since, at the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had proclaimed his opposition to the emirates of the Gulf, which had collaborated with the United States and which he accused of pursuing an economic war against Arab countries by proposing a new division of oil revenues, and after the invasion, he made virulent and jihadist speeches against the United States, but as J. L. Esposito has underscored,

the Gulf crisis witnessed a shift among many Islamic movements from an initial Islamic ideological rejection of Saddam Hussain, the secular persecutor of Islamic movements, and his invasion of Kuwait to a more populist Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist support for Saddam and the condemnation of foreign intervention and occupation. The key variable or catalyst was the massive Western (especially U.S.) military buildup in the region and its presence near Islam’s sacred cities, as well as the threat of military action against an Arab nation and of a permanent Western presence. (Esposito 1997:58)

The lessons drawn from the Gulf crisis were all the bitterer because Senegal sent a contingent of its own troops.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Saddam Hussein’s negative image helps explain why the AEMUD kept its distance from the debates surrounding the second Gulf Crisis, during which Iraq was called on to prove that it had eliminated its weapons of mass destruction.<sup>7</sup>

The fierce opposition to the United States and Israel is so well anchored in the association’s discourse that, in its eagerness to render a judicial opinion (*fatwa*) on a social event, the editorial staff of the AEMUD’s newspaper called for a boycott of Israeli and American products.<sup>8</sup> Opposition to the United States increased with news of the first cases in which Taliban fighters were being imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay in January 2002, and with the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. President Bush was even compared to

Hitler.<sup>9</sup> The break with Israel became final with the election of Ariel Sharon in February 2001, the subsequent construction of a protective wall in the West Bank (otherwise known as “the Apartheid Wall”<sup>10</sup>), and Israel’s assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yassine, the spiritual leader of Hamas, on 22 March 2004.

The AEMUD’s outlook on contemporary international affairs was equally acerbic regarding the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The AEMUD criticized the tardiness of the West’s intervention in Bosnia at a time when Serbia “emulated Hitler and Rudolf Hess,” and engaged in “a doctrine of ethnic cleansing.” The association clearly affirmed that the West was hesitant to intervene in this conflict because Bosnians “were terribly wrong in being, for the most part, Muslims, and not being Jews, Freemasons, Christians, or, who knows, maybe animists or atheists!”<sup>11</sup> The AEMUD repeatedly drew similarities between the plight of Jews in Nazi concentration camps and that of Bosnians in order to underscore the unequal treatment of the two groups by the international community.<sup>12</sup> The association went so far as to compare the “plotted genocide of Bosnian Muslims” to Nazism, Apartheid, and Zionism.<sup>13</sup> The conflict in Kosovo was presented as a repetition of the Bosnian conflict. In the same way, the West was criticized for reacting hesitantly to both the Chechen conflict and the Palestinian situation. By contrast, the West was accused of having reacted too quickly when the Taliban destroyed statues at Bamayan in Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup> However, all these examples were used to support a thesis whereby the West, across the globe and regardless of its particular ideological manifestation, does not treat all peoples equally and is behind postcolonial wars, and the result is “that the perception of a cynical Western double-standard becomes a bit more certain” (Burgat 2005:61). These examples were offered to counter the image of a Western order which seeks to be universal, but they nevertheless lie “out of historical context as *meta-references*, summarizing the fight between good and evil, oppression and resistance” (Bozarslan 2004:23).

The AEMUD also attacked “orientalists” and the Muslim brotherhoods.<sup>15</sup> It condemned the conflicts of interest among government officials and the brotherhoods while it savagely criticized the latter for issuing *ndigël* ‘recommendations’ (in Wolof) in support of Abdou Diouf during the February 1983<sup>16</sup> and February 1993 election campaigns.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, a new relationship developed between the state and the Mouride brotherhood. This notably followed the end of Abdou Lahat Mbacké’s caliphate (in 1989), which had openly supported the power of Abdou Diouf. This support was derided to the point that the new Caliph General, Serigne Saliou Mbacké, did not issue a *ndigël* favorable to the Socialist Party in 1993. AEMUD derided various regimes and their anti-Islamic and secular policies, while bitterly lamenting the lack of unity among Senegalese Muslims as evidenced by the overly segmented movement of Islamic associations.<sup>18</sup> It condemned the xenophobia held toward Muslims, the prime example being the notion of *ivoirité* as used in Côte d’Ivoire. Returning to the question of secularism, the AEMUD accused the secular Senegalese state of being on

the West's payroll. By choosing to interview Mouhammad Niang, coordinator of the Groupe d'initiative pour le référendum sur l'application de la loi islamique,<sup>19</sup> on 7 January 2001, just as a new constitution was being written for the country,<sup>20</sup> the AEMUD put into question how political power was being used. It was from this perspective that the debate over the new code of family law was carried on at the local level, with the document being described as anti-Islamic, disrespectful of individuals' freedom of conscience, giving incentive to the depravity of morals, and conducive to the secularization of Islam.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, at the international level, it criticized the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for not respecting Qur'anic principles.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to opposing the secularity of nation-states, the AEMUD addressed economic issues within two different contexts: that of the plans for economic restructuring which emerged in the 1980s (and especially the implementation of the "Emergency Plan" in 1993), and that of the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994. Assessed together, these contexts led the association to look on the government of Abdou Diouf as being at the beck and call of its international backers (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), as evidenced by the fact that, throughout the restructuring process, the government agreed to remove itself from several different sectors of the economy. This way of reading the facts must be viewed with a critical eye insofar as, up until the end of the 1980s, "Diouf and his supporters were not 'disciplined' agents of the IMF and the World Bank (Diop 2004: 13). It was only in 1994 that economic liberalization (Diop, 2002: 62–82), and other initiatives, were pursued with the determination necessary for Senegal to be considered an "obedient pupil." Nevertheless, the social situation, notably in health and education, worsened at the end of the 1990s, leading the AEMUD to portray the Diouf government as unjust for continuing to impose a harsh tax burden without lessening the constantly growing national debt. Nor was the Senegalese state considered a democracy, for it was always distancing itself from the interests of its people,<sup>23</sup> and it asked for sacrifices from the Senegalese people during the devaluation process.<sup>24</sup> This criticism went so far as to present Senegal as a banana republic,<sup>25</sup> and in this way the AEMUD drew similar conclusions to those case studies which stress the persistence of corruption and inefficiency within state institutions (Samb 2004: 50–53), the extravagant lifestyles of public figures, the poor management of public resources, and government's easing of rent-seeking (Gaye and Diop 2002:108).

Alongside this globalized denunciation (Roussillon 2004:78) there were calls for Islamic unity and awakening. Indeed, although Arabism was played down and Arab regimes were strongly criticized, calls for unity were nevertheless made, and anything that symbolized global Islamic revival was looked on kindly. There was a "new development of pan-Islamism at the expense of pan-Arabism" (Nicolas 1988:38).

### *Toward a transnational Islamic identity?*

On many occasions, the AEMUD warmly welcomed the rise of radical Islamic movements, which it saw as part of a global “awakening of the Islamic consciousness.” In this context, the association was especially interested in the Algerian elections held in June 1990 and December 1991 and the rise of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). The latter, founded on 10 March 1989, was described as the “undeniable entrance of Islamic phenomenon into the international political arena.”<sup>26</sup> In the association’s view, the electoral victory of FIS in October 1988 gave hope to Muslims throughout the world who sought to assert their Islamic identity: “[The electoral success of the FIS] symbolizes the rejection of the exogenous model of development that continually violated the Islamic identity of a whole people.”<sup>27</sup> Likewise, the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) in Tunisia was seen as an “expression of the desire to resist Bourguiba’s arrogant secularization.”<sup>28</sup> This position reflected a strategy of resisting the West’s cultural and political hegemony of rejecting the legitimacy of the Algerian regime, which was considered incompetent and corrupt: the electoral victories of the FIS signified a rejection of the “secular military-political dynasty born out of the ‘stolen’ Revolution of 1954.”<sup>29</sup> The AEMUD thus subscribed to the arguments of Maghrebian Islamic movements, which believed that “independence has not held its political and economic promises, still less its cultural promises” (Burgat 1988:67). Hence, the mobilization of youth, unemployed graduates, and members of the *petite bourgeoisie* who had felt the full effects of the economic crisis of the mid-1980s and, in some cases, demanded an end to the economic privileges granted to francophone interests in order to make way for arabization (Vandewalle 1997:33–51; Willis 1996). The AEMUD focused on the FIS’s victories without delving into the outbreak of civil war following the cancelling of legislative elections in December 1991 (Martinez 1998)—a development that notably showed that

“The Algerian Islamist movement . . . was incapable of sustaining unity between the poor urban youth and the devout middle class. . . . During the civil war, Algeria split completely into two opposing factions: the Groupe Islamique Armé (urban poor) and the Armée Islamique du Salut (middle class)” (Kepel 2002:169).

In the case of Afghanistan, the AEMUD considered that, to begin with, Afghan resistance to the Russian invasion was the very symbol of a well-run jihad,<sup>30</sup> and that, later on, this positive image of Afghan resistance was lost when the movement split along clan lines<sup>31</sup> and became dependent on intervention by neighboring Muslim countries (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran).<sup>32</sup> Competition among political actors, including Massoud, Rashid Dostom, and Hekmatyâr, became increasingly intense over the course of 1992, leading to the collapse of the state and civil war on the one hand,

and to the intervention on a massive scale of neighboring states on the other. Nevertheless, this reading of the facts ignores two important factors. First, the Afghan resistance, faced with the Soviet invasion, was already fractured insofar as it reflected strongly established social structures and a segmentation of civil society whereby attachment to a region and a tribe or ethnic group was paramount (Dorronsoro 2000; Edwards 2002; Saikal 2004). Second, the aforementioned intervention of Muslim countries was evident throughout the Soviet invasion in the 1980s (Roy 1986; Rubin 2002).

Despite these contradictions, all the above-mentioned elements allowed the association to celebrate the unity of the *umma* and to demonstrate Islam's dynamic opposition to international forces. It was able to insist on the fact that Islamic revival was the result of a new consciousness of the evolution of the world on the part of civil societies and the latter's desire to live under democratic regimes:

Truly being in tune with a society whose deepest beliefs are under constant attack, Islamic leaders clearly advocate a social project that embraces the benefits of modernity and is inspired by the unchanging principles and values of Islam. In this way, their members and followers are represented in all sectors of society and therefore are not 'visitors from Mars' come to infiltrate sovereign governments. They are indeed the People.<sup>33</sup>

Following the same logic, the application of the Shari'ah in several northern states of Nigeria emanates—according to the association—from the population's desire to “provide itself with institutions that are more in line with their beliefs and their culture.”<sup>34</sup>

Overall, these arguments fully support political-religious proselytization (*da'wa*) and clearly indicate a regular cultivation of the emotional register. The aim was to show how Muslims were continually victimized by the state and its agents, irrespective of the particular regime's ideology. This is why the AEMUD participated in a protest in Dakar on 18 March 1989, to prohibit the distribution and sale of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, considered blasphemous by many Muslims.<sup>35</sup> It explains the association's interest in various questions: the imprisonment of MTI members and sympathizers;<sup>36</sup> the repressive policies of the Maghrebian states toward Islamists; the condition of Muslims on the island of Cyprus from the Ottoman conquest to the foundation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as well as the conflicts between the Turkish and Greek communities on the island;<sup>37</sup> the situation of Muslims in Bosnia (with six other Senegalese Islamic associations, the AEMUD published a declaration on 27 August 1992 in support of the Bosnian Muslims)<sup>38</sup>; and the positions of Hamas, considered the only movement capable of changing the destiny of the Palestinian people,<sup>39</sup> regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization, considered politically and militarily ineffective and weak.<sup>40</sup> The association showed an interest in new converts to Islam in France, a country it considered hostile to Muslims. In

an interview with a 21-year-old computer analyst from a French Roman Catholic family who had just converted to Islam, the AEMUD's objective was clear: show that despite an unfriendly atmosphere, Islam is a dynamic religion, attractive to young professionals and capable of supplanting other religions, insofar as it "laid out straightforward rules."<sup>41</sup> Also, it gave great weight to any initiatives displaying unity and cohesion within the Muslim world. It therefore perceived the creation of the Conseil National Islamique as a sign of the "the maturity of Côte d'Ivoire's Muslim community."<sup>42</sup>

The more Islam was portrayed as a victim of a growing international conspiracy, the greater the importance given to the international presence of Islamist movements, because of their ability to attract major media coverage and their "ability to recruit" (Goussault 1990:493). Thus, the Iranian revolution of 1979 held the association's attention up until the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, which it saw as marking the end of the international phase of the revolution and the beginning of the reign of religious nationalism, a synonym of degeneration.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, the AEMUD viewed Ayatollah Khomeini as possessing great political talent insofar as he symbolized resistance, having attacked the United States and ended a corrupt regime, which had allied itself with the West (Daniel 2001:175–195; Keddie 2003:214–239). It celebrated him for having declared a *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie—an action that had international repercussions. This stance illustrates the impact of the Iranian Revolution on the southern Sahara (Esposito 1990:283–316) and especially in Senegal during the 1980s. From June to October 1984, the newspaper *Wal Fadji*, launched by Sidy Lamine Niass, published Ayatollah Khomeini's *Manifesto of the Islamic State* (Gomez-Perez 1994:79–98), and Ahmed Khalifa, Niass's brother, supported these publications with anti-French sermons, which earned him the nickname "Ayatollah of Koakack," for the city located South-East of Dakar (Magassouba 1985).

With the death of Khomeini, the *umma* sought a new leader; even if Kadafi was not up to the role, it applauded his anti-imperialist actions. François Burgat aptly points out that Kadafi was

not only more Arabist but also more Muslim than Nasser, who, in unitarian discourse, restored the status of those upholding Islam. . . . In many ways, the premature reintroduction (in the early 70s) of many of Islam's categories into Libyan politico-legal language even allowed him to appear to be the first Islamist head of state (a title he rejected). (Burgat 1988:36–37; see also Vandewalle 2006:33–51; Joffé 1988:38–51)

The AEMUD focussed on Kadafi's role as a unifying force, bringing together the countries of the Sahel and the Sahara,<sup>44</sup> "following the Libyan initiative of August 1997[,] which brought together the Saharan states of Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali[,] and Niger, leading to the project of the United States of the Sahara" and the launch, "in February 1998 [of] the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD)" (Perrin 2004:34–35). Thus, the association

completely ignored the policy of destabilization followed by Kaddafi in his relations with neighboring states, notably in Chad (Lemarchand 1988:106–124; Otayek 1986; St John 1988:125–138) and which could still have negative effects on the future development of CENSAD. Also, Hassan Al-Turabi, following his forced departure as an Islamic *éminence grise* of the Saudi government, though not considered a leader of the *umma*, was presented as an important figure for the contemporary Islamic movement because of his opinions, writings, and especially his central role in the Islamization of the state.<sup>45</sup> Likewise, Bin Laden was seen as a “servant emeritus of the noble cause,” and seemed to provide renewed hope, insofar as he pursued confrontation with the United States.<sup>46</sup>

It would be an exaggeration to say that the AEMUD shows an ideological affiliation with any of the four figures discussed above, since the latter’s discourses were not translated or commented upon by the association. The AEMUD’s ideological corpus is in fact a composite of several radical political Islamic trends. Apart from the centrality of the Koran and the Sunna (discussed below), ten years after the initiative taken by the JIR, the AEMUD still shared a similar ideology to that organization, while seeking to maintain a certain independence of action. Thus, the AEMUD followed in the footsteps of the JIR by translating excerpts from Sayyid Qutb’s *Milestones on the Road*.<sup>47</sup> It saw Qutb as the father of all dissenting Islamic movements of the 1970s for having “radically questioned obedience to the Prince in the name of a cohesive Muslim community” (Bozarslan 2004:22–23) and for being a visionary for having “realized very early on that the future belonged to Islam.”<sup>48</sup> But this is the only direct reference the newspapers offered to its readers in sixteen years of publication. This book has become “. . . the *What is to Be Done?* of the Islamicist movement” (Kepel 2003:43); as the manifesto of Islamic action, it was circulated, translated, and read by certain Senegalese Islamic militants, including Ahmed Kanté, the Friday imam at the Cheikh Anta Diop University mosque. Furthermore, the AEMUD was in full agreement with the content of the book, which originates in “the observation of the bankruptcy of the West, of both capitalism and socialism” and “the assertion that the resurrection of Islam holds the solution to humanity’s problems” (Kepel 2003:46).

Alongside the stances it took on international issues, the AEMUD reacted to issues that had an impact on the daily lives of Senegalese citizens. Working with several other Islamic associations, including Al Falah, the JIR, and the OAI, it was a founding member of the Comité Islamique pour la Réforme du Code de la Famille au Sénégal, which denounced certain anti-Islamic elements of the text and proposed specific amendments to various articles<sup>49</sup> according to the principles of the Koran. The objectives of such a committee were twofold. First, it aimed to reanimate a debate going back to 1972, when the code of family law had been adopted and the leaders of the brotherhoods had expressed strong opposition. Second, it sought to reopen “Senegal’s social contract” by pursuing the controversy that was “again launched in 1996 around the bill limiting polygamy to two wives” and

which had been associated since 1998 with the “issue of paternal authority and the argument for the sharing of authority between the two spouses” (Brossier 2004:82–83) and by creating a synergy with the brotherhoods and certain political parties to pressure the government into changing the legal code. This pressure increased when Abdoulaye Wade came to power, in 2000. From the outset of his presidency, his words and actions combined the spiritual with the temporal, leading the Islamic associations to believe that conditions were ripe for change; however, they have yet to achieve any real success (Gomez-Perez 2005a:193–222).

Overall, the critiques analyzed above show how the AEMUD rejected all cultural hegemony and advocated an alternative value system, linked to the frequently emphasized social dimension of Islam. It often highlighted the qualities of equity and tolerance in Islam to defend the emergence of a new model. It took care to overlook certain contemporary events that reflected extreme xenophobia and profoundly affected the collective conscious of the Senegalese: the anti-Moor riots, which took place in April and May 1989.<sup>50</sup>

Faced with the diversity of Islam’s enemies, the AEMUD put forward a modified cultural model, expressed not in terms of East, West, Arabism, Marxism, or Liberalism, but in terms of the principles of fraternity, solidarity, and tolerance. Thus, the AEMUD responded to the West’s alleged conspiracy, the West’s allies, and the West’s enemies within the Muslim world by declaring its intent to do away with the existing political framework and to promote an Islamic and antihegemonic alternative. It described the battle as being for civilization itself, since it reflected not only local ambitions, but also a desire to change the world.

### **Neither East nor West: toward a new world order?**

All of the AEMUD’s discourse was based on the preeminence of the Koran, given that the text was treated as applicable to any moment in the evolution of a society and as capable of giving meaning to any society which followed its teachings. This has led Bruno Étienne to state:

The Koran is not simply a practical guide for the organization of individual and community life; it is the fundamental principle governing the operation of society insofar as that society emerges from the real movement which, through the actions of men, allows the whole of humanity and the individual man to discover their true being. History has one meaning, only one meaning. The Koran is a collection of God’s instructions for how to create this history. (Étienne 1987:41)

The AEMUD interpreted such an approach as a call to work toward the achievement of a new world order, independent of the East–West dichotomy and therefore self-sufficient. Its reasoning can be interpreted as political in

three different ways. First, by putting the sacred text at the center of managing the collectivity, human will becomes irrelevant, because anything of importance can be found in God's message as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed by the angel Gabriel. Second, that the Prophet had had to fight for the people to accept the Koran gives the latter a political significance. Third, placing this text at the center of society constitutes a call to turn away from the political system embodied by the Senegalese government and the whole of the Western world. Thus, the AEMUD defended the idea that Islam "is not only a set of beliefs, it is an 'all-encompassing order,' a 'total order,' a *nizâm*" (Roy 1992:60–61).

*Rejection of modernity, Islamization of modernity, or modernization of Islamicness?*

For the AEMUD, Senegal needed to liberate itself from Western institutions by appropriating modernity through Islamization and with a concern for equity and morality. In this way, modernity would not be rejected, but reconfigured:

[Islamism] proposes a counterplan of modernity that claims to be able to satisfy all aspirations, that is really to say the secular aspirations of everyone. . . . Islamism seeks to link modernity—which it perceives only in its local, popular, and ultramaterialistic form—with the values of liberty, equality, justice, and humanism, which are perceived as Islamic values. This is a reaction against an impoverished and impoverishing modernity in the name of so-called Islamic ideals that, in fact, are just the values of modernity and secularization. This is why Islamism is not 'anti-modernité, but 'contre-modernité'. (Ghalioun 1994:26–27)

A relevant example can be found in a sermon given in the Dakar campus mosque in May 2000, in which the technical and scientific progress ("space shuttles, telecommunications, information highways, manipulation of the genetic code") of modernity were not denied or renounced, but rather rejected for having—according to the *imam*—made mankind dependent on material progress without giving humanity an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of life: "Yes, the cult of means, the worship of the holy *how*, has led us to push aside the fundamental question of the *why*. . . . Islam continually teaches that what fills human life with meaning is the worship of God."<sup>51</sup> Here, it was a question of the ongoing debate between materialism and spirituality that led the AEMUD to differentiate itself from Western modernity and "give it . . . all the qualities of otherness" (Burgat 1988:70).

It is often argued that the Koran is not opposed to modernity; its text has scientific value, and it harbors technologies confirmed by science. It is claimed that the Koran foresaw developments in embryology,<sup>52</sup>

beekeeping,<sup>53</sup> and the health inspection of foods.<sup>54</sup> The rejection of Western-style modernity does not mean that the tools offered by modernity are not to be exploited: on the contrary, it is a matter of Islamicizing modernity by referring to Islam's fundamental principles, invoking Sharī'a and creating the Islamic state, and recognizing that Islam can produce its own standards and is closer to the aspirations of humankind. Beginning with the principle that Islam is open to all manifestations of modernity that do not contradict fundamental Koranic principles, no modern technology—computers, the Internet, cellular telephones, etc.—is rejected to the extent that it facilitates proselytization and helps counter the "uniformization" of the news that media broadcast throughout the world.

Globalization and its characteristics are considered to be a central issue in society that Muslims must reflect upon and address because if they do not do so, they will be overcome. Momar Dieng from the AEMUD states that the more the issue of globalization becomes important, the more Muslims must become actors, not observers, in globalization. To do this, he proposes an appropriation of globalization and all its characteristics so as to live them in compliance with the principles of Islam. He subverts the model of the nation-state to propose a model in which "faith, science, and organization"<sup>55</sup> would coexist. He concludes with a parallel between the Prophet's hegira (Mohammed's journey from Mecca to Medina), considered an "absolute political permanence," and this reappropriation of globalization, as if the distancing-reappropriating of globalization signified for Muslims a new page in their history, just as the hegira symbolizes the beginning of a strengthened Muslim community. The connection between these periods recreates a continuity between the early years of Islam (the time of the Prophet) and the present-day, and provides an Islamic way of interpreting globalization through the call to establish a new world order while confirming the supremacy of the Prophet's time (see below). This period is considered to hold a universal value. Thus, the AEMUD was able to position itself outside of a strictly local, national, or African context, and stand squarely on the global stage. The struggle it was fighting was not just political, but also cultural.

### *Rejection of the nation-state or the umma as referential system*

Another particularity of the AEMUD's discourse is that it entered into the symbolic and the mythical by referring to the Golden Age of Islam, that is to say the time of the Prophet, his companions, and his first four successors, called "the Rightly Guided Caliphs," during which the proselytization (*da'wa*) was at the center of the action. These times are idealized: a time when God's message was revealed to Mohammed in all its purity by the angel Gabriel, a time when part of the world rose out of ignorance and out *jāhiliyya* (pre-Islam, before the Revelation), a time during which the first Islamic society developed. This glorified past showed that Muslims were on the right path so long as they understood and respected the fundamental principles of Islam. These times symbolized justice, infallible faith, and the foundation

of a *dâr al-Islâm*. Henceforth, the notion of historical process was no longer relevant (Roy 1992:110–101). The centuries that followed were but a digression, and the long interlude of colonization was of little importance, since it broke the continuity and connection between today's Muslims and their ancestors of the time of the Revelation. In fact, the reference *par excellence* is the ethical and political model of the constitution of the original city of Medina. According to the association, it revolutionized individual and social relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims because a faith community was created, the "blood relations (clan and tribe)" were overcome, and the principles of "solidarity, assistance, and mutual help" were established alongside the duties of "equality," "justice" and "tolerance" of religious and tribal minorities to keep the peace.<sup>56</sup> In keeping with this logic, the AEMUD subscribed to a logic of culturalism that "believes that a culture is a corpus of representations stable in time[,] . . . a closed loop[,] . . . [and it] determines a specific political orientation" (Bayart 1996:74). For the association, a state became an Islamic state at the moment when the collectivity as a whole became aware of the need for change and showed a desire to live according to Qur'anic principles, following a model of original purity that allows one to return to truth (Bayart 1996:85–86, 111). However, there is no process laid out for achieving such an Islamic state so as to better declare that that the practice of politics must respect religious tenets and that Islamic law is above reproach, complete, and self-sufficient, and allows all of society to function smoothly because it emanates from God's omniscient and all-powerful will:

neither the people, nor the parliament, nor the sovereign knows how to be originators of law. On its own, the state does not have a positive existence. . . . What is important is therefore that men, beginning with the leaders, yield to divine law. (Roy 1992:86)

The *umma* prevails, and it is defined as an entity that allows Muslims to solidify their connections through their common faith, regardless of their culture or which country they live in. It is first and foremost a religious notion, and a political notion second. This attachment to a collective notion raises questions regarding the concept of power and of the achievement of power within the AEMUD. Was its vision revolutionary, favorable to an Islamic revolution like Iran's? Did it choose to retreat in anticipation of the emergence of an Islamic consciousness? Or was it prepared to cooperate with the state?

#### *Toward political legalism or state intervention?*

The AEMUD believed in replacing the state with another system, the Shari'a,<sup>57</sup> which it considered faultless, fair, and universal because it stems directly from the will of God: "the 'shari'a myth' has largely replaced that

of the ‘just sovereign’” (Krämer 2004:137). For the sake of pragmatism, the AEMUD was not antistate, but against any state intervention with regard to religion. To my knowledge, it did not participate in the first Islamic declaration of July 1988, an OAI initiative, implemented after other Islamic associations had assessed the March 1988 election riots (Diouf and Diop 2002:108–115; Diop and Diouf 1990:335–354). The riots were led by young people who were not old enough to vote or not registered on the electoral list; they used the word *sopi* (“change” in Wolof)<sup>58</sup> as their rallying cry. Indeed, it should be remembered that in the context of a major socioeconomic crisis, the announcement of Abdou Diouf’s victory in the 1988 presidential elections exasperated the opposition and the country’s youth, both of whom claimed the elections had been rigged, and led to major postelection disturbances, the like of which had never been witnessed. The result of these developments was to weaken Diouf’s power during the 1990s and to permit Abdoulaye Wade to win the 2000 presidential elections, following a strong turnout, which notably included large numbers of young voters (Diouf and Diop 2002:131–137).

That the AEMUD did not take a public position in this instance corresponds to a more general tendency, whereby young urban dwellers “rebuked their Muslim peers for their political compromises<sup>59</sup> [and] did not appear to show the slightest interest for the revival of Islam as a means to overcome” (Cruise O’Brien 2002:92) the unprecedented sociopolitical crisis in Senegal. The AEMUD was not among the Islamic associations that joined the “contact and monitoring group for Muslim unity” on 21 February 1993 in urging the populace, and particularly young people, to go to the polls and calling on the candidates to take a stand in support of the opposition platform, but the AEMUD did align itself with the declaration made by the seventeen associations when it insisted on recording the Muslim votes for the candidate who best represented Muslim aspirations and encouraging young people to register to vote.<sup>60</sup> It participated in the context that saw students become particularly active in the 1993 elections (Diouf 1994:47–64) by showing their opposition to the regime of Abdou Diouf (Gérard 1993:108–115) through meeting with certain candidates to learn more about their agenda. These actions were incorporated into a new strategy, which steered away from refusing to participate in or trying to avoid politics, for truly—and in this I concur with Olivier Roy—an Islamic society “is founded on the virtue of its members and not on its institutions, viewed as simple transitory instruments. . . . Islam proposes a model of society that is founded on individual virtue, and not on the model of the State” (1991:198).

Five years later, during the legislative elections in May 1988, the AEMUD was concerned by the fact that the political situation had not changed, and it asked all of the country’s Muslim organizations to assess whether the candidates’ actions were aligned with the interests of Islam. These elections seem to have been a testing ground for the presidential elections of 2000. Indeed, following Abdoulaye Wade’s victory in this election, the association identified a clear evolution in its discourse. Linking itself to

the joy of the population, especially among the youth, it believed that a new era was dawning, one that would offer freedom of expression to all religious groups; however, its enthusiasm was checked (such a reserved attitude is common among all Islamic movements expressing defiance toward political authorities) because the new president has always played the liberal card,<sup>61</sup> far from the principles of Islam. The newspaper's editorialist concluded that there was an opportunity for the associated Islamic groups to become major players in the political arena if Wade, the candidate for hope and change, failed to deliver on his promises (Havard 2004:22–38).<sup>62</sup> This analysis was corroborated by two other members of the association when a rift between the marabouts (leaders in traditional Islam, in Sufi Islam) and their followers (*taalibé*), observed during the election, was described as good news. This rift indicated, in their eyes, the limits of the influence of *ndigèls* and the possibility that an Islamic alternative could exercise a significant degree of political influence<sup>63</sup>; however, the AEMUD neglected to mention that political power was moving further and further away from secularization—which raised the possibility of a “deregulation of the hitherto inaccessible field of relations between politics and religion” (Dahou and Foucher 2004:18; Gomez-Perez 2005a:193–222).

While discussing an entry into the political field, the AEMUD never encouraged recourse to violence, even if it had to condemn violent campus encounters with *dahira* brotherhood militants, and even if the AEMUD did refer to Sayyid Qutb, Hamas, and Bin Laden, all of whom justified the use of violence for creating a new society. Nevertheless, all the necessary discursive ingredients were present to declare the breakdown of secularism was a reality, and I suspect that it was no coincidence that at the same moment, two articles on the advantages of Shari‘a were published.<sup>64</sup>

The implementation of this purely Islamic society required particular social and cultural conditions. In making this point, the AEMUD referred to verse 11 of surah 13 (“Allah changes not the condition of a folk until they change that which is in their heart”) and used *da‘wa* as often as possible to spread the message of the Koran and instil it in the minds of the people. This is why, beginning in May 2001, the editors of the association's newspaper placed a new emphasis on clerics from around the world, and they called on its readers to submit questions that the publication would have answered by specialists.<sup>65</sup> In addition, the AEMUD considered a precise knowledge of the five pillars of Islam, and the philosophy and cultural practices related to them, paramount for the creation of a Muslim society. The association insisted on cultural revolution, or a revolution in popular attitudes, for people to become honest, virtuous, pious Muslims. For this reason, it regularly repeated the important deeds of the Prophet's most illustrious companions to provide readers with examples that symbolize—according to their standards—honesty, integrity, generosity, and morality. The goal was for every Muslim to understand Islamic history and its origins, so that it would be revived and live on. The newspaper regularly punctuated its lessons on Islam with surahs so as to make the writing seem more

authentic. It examined the practices of prayer, fasting, and *zakât* (obligatory almsgiving), the third pillar of Islam, which it considered a social regulator, intended to develop solidarity and brotherhood between the rich and the poor.<sup>66</sup> It considered explanations of the cultural practices connected with the *tabaski* (sheep-sacrificing holiday) and the symbolism of this holiday a way of honoring the feeling of belonging to the Islamic faith. It explained the significance of marriage in reference to the Koran, which considers marriage a sacred and moral deed, insofar as it is a means of avoiding “fornication, perversion, and rape.”<sup>67</sup> Women and young girls who decided to wear the veil were supported in their decision to uphold the principles of the Koran.<sup>68</sup> Given the importance accorded to the *Pari Mutuel Urbain* (PMU), readers were reminded that any form of gambling is strictly forbidden by the Koran, as are psychic rituals and wine, all in an effort to avoid greed and immorality.<sup>69</sup> It seems obvious that through this series of lessons, the association was assigning itself the role of spiritual guide, which would show the path toward the creation of a new society.

## Conclusion

The phases of the AEMUD’s discourse show that its interpretations of the world and of the self were not simple nostalgia for the early days of Islam: rather, it put forth a subtle mix of divine law, references to the time of the Prophet, and contemporary political and religious issues with strong emotional resonance wherein symbol and myth are combined with the chronology of events and with modern technology, not to mention references specific to the Islamic culture of Senegal. This interweaving of elements shows how much its ideological corpus was complex and stratified.

The construction of the association’s discourse appears to have been an ongoing process, which evolved alongside the local, continental, and international political situation:

We are faced with a polymorphic discourse that is assembled from rather incongruous fragments (sermons and communications presented at retreat seminars, interviews, etc.) that are somewhat determined by circumstances. . . . But to speak of the absence of a finalized project is to speak of the complete absence of a project. By its vigorous internal coherence and constant reference to the divine code expressed in the Koran, this discourse sketches out a transcendental order as an alternative plan to the currently imposed order. (Otayek 1993:112–113)

The AEMUD carried on a discursive attack against the ideological, political, and cultural hegemony of the West. It continually called for Islam to play a meaningful role in the political life of Senegal and other countries, and

promoted the supremacy of Islamic law as the touchstone of the *umma*. In the process, it raised two questions, if only implicitly: that of the future relations between two models of civilization, the Western and the Islamic; and that of future confrontation between the national context, which defines the development of the state, and the transnational context, which defines the development of the *umma*. The challenge was obviously an imposing one, and it shows how deeply the AEMUD, whose horizons were in some ways limited to the Dakar campus, was dedicated to action at local and international levels, and how pervasively it participated, despite the ambiguity and ambivalence of its discourse, in the “cultural and political resurgence of Muslim civilization” (Burgat 1995:247).

## NOTES

1. Muslim Students' Association of Dakar University.
2. I examine the newspapers from April 1989 to June 2005.
3. The debate was so virulent that the Senegalese government decided to forbid the sale of the book by a decree on 24 February 1989.
4. Ils voulaient détruire l'islam, ils ont renforcé les musulmans, *L'Étudiant musulman* 2 (April 1989), 1.
5. Crise du Golfe: le temps des certitudes, *L'Étudiant musulman* 3 (August 1990), 15.
6. M. Dieng, Crise du golfe : qui n'a pas compris? *L'Étudiant musulman* 4 (January–March 1991), 20.
7. P. Diaou, Oummah: crise du golfe: impasse de la politique américaine envers l'Irak, *L'Étudiant musulman* 30 (April–May 1998), 15–17; I. Sow, Golfe: tout est bien qui finit bien, *L'Étudiant musulman* 30 (April–May 1998), 15–17.
8. Dr. Y. Al Qardaoui, Boycott des marchandises israéliennes et américaines, *L'Étudiant musulman* 41 (May–June 2001), 16.
9. M. Samb, Guantanamo: un camp de concentration yankee, *L'Étudiant musulman* 48 (May–June 2003), 11.
10. M. Sanghare, Palestine: le mur de la honte, *L'Étudiant musulman* 51 (April 2004), 18.
11. M. Dieng, Bosnie Herzégovine: tous savaient! *L'Étudiant musulman* 10 (September–November 1992), 19.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. A. K. Diaw, Afghanistan: les statues sont-elles encore des idoles? *L'Étudiant musulman* 41 (May–June 2001), 10–11. Without taking a clear stand, the association showed just how much Muslims are divided in regard to the Taliban's opinions and religious acts, and tended to be closer to the position that states that these statues *should* have been destroyed, as long as they were historical monuments and not icons.
15. A. Ba, Dossier: la chari'a: une miséricorde pour l'humanité, *L'Étudiant musulman* 6 (July–September 1991), 5.
16. A. B. Diouf, Jeunesse musulmane et élections, *L'Étudiant musulman* 11 (February 1993), 13.
17. S. Ahmad, Conviction: quel vote? *L'Étudiant musulman* 11 (February 1993), 18.

18. S'unir ou périr! *L'Étudiant musulman* 7 (October–December 1991), 1.
19. Mouhammad Niang, Le déclic contre la laïcité est irréversible, *L'Étudiant musulman* 40 (January–February 2001), 6.
20. Wade first decided to take out the word *secular*, but then ended up using it again after causing an outcry, particularly from Senegalese intellectuals.
21. M. Dieng, Code de la famille du Sénégal: les dessous anti-islamiques, *L'Étudiant musulman* 6 (July–September 1991), 15.
22. M. Ndiaye, L'OCI: une organisation dévoyée, *L'Étudiant musulman* 6 (July–September 1991), 21.
23. This argument is also used in reference to the Maghreb's military regimes.
24. A. Diouf, Sénégal: l'Etat dévalise le peuple, *L'Étudiant musulman* 15 (February 1994), 15.
25. M. Dieng, Editorial: bananière, c'est clair! *L'Étudiant musulman* 30 (April–May 1998), 3.
26. M. Ndiaye, Algérie: l'alternative islamique, une réalité, *L'Étudiant musulman* 3 (August 1990), 14.
27. Ibid.
28. M. Dieng and M. M. Ndiaye, Maghreb: les islamistes et les autres, *L'Étudiant musulman* 6 (July–September 1991), 19.
29. M. Ndiaye, Algérie: l'alternative islamique, une réalité, *L'Étudiant musulman* 3 (August 1990), 14.
30. Ils voulaient détruire l'islam, ils ont renforcé les musulmans, *L'Étudiant musulman* 2 (April 1989), 1.
31. Crépuscule d'un jihad, *L'Étudiant musulman* 9 (May–July 1992), 18; M. Dieng, Afghanistan: la désolation, *L'Étudiant musulman* 10 (September–November 1992), 22.
32. M. Dieng, Afghanistan: piège et espoir, *L'Étudiant musulman* 16 (May 1994), 18.
33. M., Dieng and M. M. Ndiaye, Maghreb: les islamistes et les autres, *L'Étudiant musulman* 6 (July–September 1991), 20.
34. A. K. Diaw, Charia au Nigeria: un retour aux sources, *L'Étudiant musulman* 41 (May–June 2001), 5.
35. Affaire Rushdie: Rassemblement du 18 mars, *L'Étudiant musulman* 2 (April 1989), 18. As a result of this demonstration, the government in power released an edict, on 24 February 1989, outlawing its distribution and sale.
36. M. Dieng and M. M. Ndiaye, Maghreb: les islamistes et les autres, *L'Étudiant musulman* 6 (July–September 1991), 19.
37. P. D. Sakho, Musulmans de Chypre: la longue marche, *L'Étudiant musulman* 10 (September–November 1992), 10.
38. Bosnie: soutien des musulmans sénégalais, *L'Étudiant musulman* 11 (February 1993), 21–22.
39. M. Dieng, Palestine: signé Hamas! *L'Étudiant musulman* 11 (February 1993), 22.
40. M. Dieng, Palestine: les désastres de Wye Plantation, *L'Étudiant musulman* 32 (January 1999), 16.
41. *L'Étudiant musulman*, 10 (September–November 1992), 10.
42. M. M., Ndiaye, Côte d'Ivoire: la longue marche des musulmans, *L'Étudiant musulman* 12 (June 1999), 22.
43. M. Kane, La révolution iranienne: une dynamique à la merci d'un talent politique, *L'Étudiant musulman* 36 (December 1999), 16–17.
44. P. Diaou, La croisade de Khadafi, *L'Étudiant musulman* 31 (July–August 1998), 14–15.
45. A. K. Diaw, Figures: Docteur Hassan ibn Abdilllah at Tourabi, *L'Étudiant musulman* 40 (January–February 2001), 10.
46. I. Sylla, Ben Laden 'mort ou vif', *L'Étudiant musulman* 43 (March–April 2002), 3.

47. *L'Étudiant musulman* 12 (June 1993), 23–24.
48. K. Diouf, Analyse de l'islamisme: les failles de l'expertise. *L'Étudiant musulman* 30 (April–May 1998), 20.
49. Article 637 about succession, article 111 about the age of marriage, article 335 about polygamy, article 152 about the status of the head of a family, 1996. Conférence de presse: collectif des associations islamiques du Sénégal le 28 octobre 1996, *L'Étudiant musulman* 24 (November–December 1996), 8–9.
50. These riots included lynching Moors in Senegal to avenge the murder of Senegalese blacks who had intervened in Mauritania.
51. Crise de sens: les réponses islamiques, *L'Étudiant musulman* 38 (May 2000), 10.
52. L'embryologie dans le Coran, *L'Étudiant musulman* 2 (April 1989), 21.
53. *L'Étudiant musulman* 6 (July–September 1991): 6–7.
54. S. Gaye, Sciences: l'inspection sanitaire des denrées alimentaires d'origine animale dans le Coran et la Sunna, *L'Étudiant musulman* 7 (October–December 1991), 4.
55. M. Dieng, Oummah: musulmans dans le siècle, *L'Étudiant musulman* 23 (July–August 1996), 4.
56. K. Diouf, Revisiter la constitution de Médine, *L'Étudiant musulman* 38 (May 2000), 7–8.
57. A. Ba, Dossier: la chari'a: une miséricorde pour l'humanité, *L'Étudiant musulman* 6 (July–September 1991), 3–4.
58. This was the slogan readopted by supporters of Abdoulaye Wade's Senegalese Democratic Party in 1988.
59. They wanted to vote for the socialist party in power, for the candidate Abdou Diouf.
60. A. B. Diouf, Jeunesse musulmane et élections 1993, *L'Étudiant musulman* 11 (February 1993), 1 and 13.
61. O. Dieng, Editorial: voie ouverte, *L'Étudiant musulman* 38 (May 2000), 3.
62. It would take only three months at the AEMUD to recognize the political shift of Abdoulaye Wade (see M. Dieng, Editorial: la revanche du reel, *L'Étudiant musulman* 39 [August 2000], 3) and a progressive individualization of power after the victory of the Senegalese Democratic Party (Wade's party) in the legislation of April 2001 (see M. Dieng, Editorial: des ruptures, on veut! *L'Étudiant musulman* 41 [May–June 2001], 3.)
63. B. Preira and K. Diouf, Les leçons d'une élection: lire et dépasser le 19 mars 2000, *L'Étudiant musulman* 38 (May 2000), 15.
64. K. Diouf, La shari'a: contrainte ou miséricorde? *L'Étudiant musulman* 38 (May 2000), 4–6; and Y. Ibram, Les principaux objectifs de la chari'a, *L'Étudiant musulman* 39 (August 2000), 4–5.
65. The first of these specialists is a graduate of Shari'a at the University of Medina and imam at the mosque Parcelles Assainies, a working-class suburb of Dakar.
66. I. Sow, Pratique culturelle: la zakat, *L'Étudiant musulman* 4 (January–March 1991), 2.
67. Le mariage: entre les obstacles de la tradition et l'institution islamique, *L'Étudiant musulman* 2 (April 1989), 2–3.
68. K. I. Gueye, Message: la femme musulmane et le voile, *L'Étudiant musulman* 3 (August 1990), 18.
69. A. B. Diouf, PMU: l'autre gagne, nous perdons, *L'Étudiant musulman* 2 (April 1989), 11.

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