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OLIVIER ROY
AMEL BOUBEKEUR
(*Editors*)

Whatever Happened to the Islamists?

Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam

Columbia University Press
New York

Columbia University Press
Publishers Since 1893
New York
cup.columbia.edu
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Whatever happened to the Islamists? : Salafis, heavy metal Muslims and the lure of consumerist Islam / Olivier Roy, Amel Boubekeur (editors).
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-231-15426-0 (alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-231-80115-7 (e-book)
1. Islam and politics. 2. Salafiyah. 3. Islam and secularism.
I. Roy, Olivier. II. Boubekeur, Amel.

BP173.7.W43 2012
320.55'7—dc23

2012003970

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Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book is printed on paper with recycled content.
Printed in India

c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the authors nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.

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When political Islam is analyzed, the reference to Islamist codes is omnipresent and now represents a common language, as much for non-activist Muslims as for the media and the state. However these codes cannot be considered a timeless framework given that the actors using them already regard it as no more than one political tradition among others.

6

POLITICAL ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA FROM THE 1980s TO THE PRESENT

Muriel Gomez-Perez

The Islamic revival which began at the end of the 1970s, and which intensified over the next two decades in francophone West Africa, can only be understood if it is first placed within a larger historical context—one that encompasses the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, it was during this earlier period that young West Africans decided to create associations, having returned from Arabic studies in Egypt, Algeria or Tunisia, or from a pilgrimage to Mecca, or business activities in the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, beginning in the mid-1940s, graduates from al-Azhar in Cairo founded the *Subbanu al-Muslimin* association in Bamako. In 1953 several young Arabic-speaking residents of Dakar, drawn from leading Marabout families, founded the Union Culturelle Musulmane [Muslim Cultural Union] (UCM). Also in Dakar, francophone Muslim students created the Association Musulmane des Étudiants d'Afrique Noire [Muslim Association of Black African Students] (AMEAN) in 1954. These new Muslim organizations had multiple goals, including the planning of conferences and debates to promote a return to the Qur'an and the Sunna, as well as a deeper knowledge of the fundamental principles of Islam. They also sought to open modernized Arabic schools with new courses (such as arithmetic, history

and Arabic grammar), and using new pedagogical methods (class levels, programs, schedules, workbooks, tables, textbooks) in order to allow Muslims of all ages to understand passages from the Qur'an without recourse to an intermediary, rather than simply memorizing them. With these objectives, these young Muslims positioned themselves as guides and as the vanguards of change, referring to themselves using the Arabic terms Salafi (Companions of the Prophet and the 'Rightly Guided' First Four Caliphs), or Wahhabi, or using the description 'crossed arms'.[1] They cast themselves in opposition to two other prominent actors. On the one hand, they criticized the practitioners of traditional Islam for their superstitious beliefs, their limited knowledge of the Qur'an, their dependent links with their followers or students (*tullab*), and their collusion with the French colonial administration. On the other hand, this same administration was criticized for trying to close Islamic schools and to limit, if not eliminate, any relations between sub-Saharan Muslims and the Arab-Muslim world. The confrontation tended to become starker at the end of the 1950s with the rise of nationalism, the movement against the Algerian War, and the campaign against the 1958 referendum and the Balkanization of Africa. Instead, the new Muslim associations favored immediate independence. This campaign was launched by the UCM at its federal congress (22–25 December 1957), where there was participation by representatives from the regions of Upper Volta, French Sudan, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire.

The victory of the 'yes' side in the referendum and the successive declarations of independence in 1960 brought an end to the dynamic activities of these groups of young Muslims for a period of about twenty years. Indeed, these young independent states, with their large Muslim majorities, were guided by the principle of secularism in their constitutions and were occasionally influenced by catholic advisors (Upper Volta). These states largely followed a proactive Islamic policy: organizing pilgrimages to Mecca; structuring the training of Arabic teachers in colleges and secondary schools; controlling the distribution of scholarships to students wishing to study at Arab universities; initiating diplomatic relations with Arab nations; and controlling and structuring religious life by creating Islamic associations[2] designed to protect the existing social and religious order. The specific objectives of these associations were to bring together all variants of Islam within each country and to serve as the transmission mechanism for what the state wanted Islam to be. They were also intended as an interface between the Arab-Muslim world and the authorities in order to obtain important subsidies from Arab countries and to gain Islamic legitimacy, both internationally and within each country. Following this logic, the young Muslims of the 1940s and 1950s were pushed aside in favor of other Muslims, sometimes drawn from the Brotherhoods (Senegal). But the most important criterion for inclusion was a readiness to openly collaborate with the newly-independent states.

Beginning at the end of the 1970s, following events in the Arab-Muslim world, a religious revival emerged, notably Senegal and then in Mali, extending to Burkina Faso, Niger, and Côte d'Ivoire beginning in the early 1990s. Numerous Islamic associations were created, whose leaders and activists demanded a central place for Islam in political and social life. First of all, this chapter will study how this religious revival manifested itself and evolved. Should it be seen as a sign of the radicalization of Islam in francophone West Africa or of the influence of the global context where Islam was suddenly taking on a prominent place in politics and international relations? Or should this hyper-religiosity be seen as the result of internal changes within the societies under study? Secondly, the main themes developed by the different movements and personalities which entered the public sphere will be analyzed. This will allow for a portrayal of how these Islamic movements were simultaneously both local and global in nature and how they represented a break with previous generations insofar as they cast themselves in a leadership role. They nevertheless occasionally collaborated with their elders on certain issues such as the moral regulation of society. Finally, this chapter will reflect on the profound significance of these changes, showing how the relationship between religion and society evolved to the point that it has become possible to speak in terms of a new religious culture which led to the emergence of a 'religious public sphere' and opened the possibility of a 'civil religion'.

Towards a More Visible and Media-Savvy Islam

Beginning in the late 1970s, and especially during the mid-1980s, the religious climate in several countries changed with the proliferation of mosques, of *madaris* and of neighborhood Islamic associations. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Association des Élèves et Étudiants Musulmans de Côte d'Ivoire [Côte d'Ivoire Muslim Students' Association] was created in 1979; the Muslim community of the Riviera in 1982; in Senegal, Jamaatou Ibadou Rahmane (JIR) was created in 1978; the Association des Étudiants Musulmans de l'Université de Dakar [Association of Muslim Students of the University of Dakar] (AEMUD) in 1984; and the Organisation pour l'Action Islamique [Organization for Islamic Action] (OAI) and Jamra in 1985. Night classes in Arabic were established and achieved success in places like Bamako. Islamic newspapers (*Études Islamiques* in July 1979; *Djamra* in 1983; *Wal Fadjri* in January 1984; *Le Musulman* in 1983; *L'Étudiant musulman* in 1989 in Senegal; and *Iqra* in 1989 in Niger) and Islamic radio programs[3] appeared on the scene. In this regard, the case of Mali was very innovative since the *ulama* showed a particular interest for radio, going so far as to offer their know-how to the programs. It should also be noted that there was a great increase in the number of public meetings, speeches, and bookstores.[4] This vitality of Islam was also evident within the Brotherhoods with the creation of *dahiras* in Senegal. Also, the 'fight for the construction of a mosque on campus was the centerpiece of this strategy for asserting a religious presence on the university scene',[5] and '[a]ll of these developments point to the possibility that the climate had evolved even if the latter cannot rightly be described as a revolutionary'.[6] That is, as Coulon states:

> Islam was no longer an activity for the old; I would go so far as to say that it is becoming an activity for the young in opposition to the gerontocratic powers. It serves to criticize the establishment. It acts as a vehicle for, and method of discovery of, the right to expression for young people. The Islamic leadership is being transformed by it, for this new elite seeks to distinguish itself from the older Muslim leaders and its members hope to act as community leaders. (...) These new clerics, whom I call litterati, believing they have more knowledge than the older generation, freely denounce the less orthodox practices of their elders and the latter's compromises with the powers that be.[7]

Islamic space grew larger during the 1990s, a sign of Islam's greater visibility. Numerous new mosques were built, especially in residential areas, and participation in the pilgrimage to Mecca increased among the young. The *madaris* were so successful that in Mali they were integrated into the state-sponsored public education system and in Côte d'Ivoire, following some Muslims who asked that their *madaris* also be integrated into the national education system. Women and youth exhibited an increased desire to display their Muslim identity, a phenomenon also evident on university campuses, in the workplace, in hotels and within government agencies, with a special focus on dress codes (loose-fitting clothing, head scarves to cover the hair, neck and shoulders) and codes of behavior (greetings, ways of speaking and looking that give external signals of one's affiliation with a particular branch of Islam and humility among women).[8] The number of Islamic associations exploded in certain countries like Niger[9] and Côte d'Ivoire[10] and their growth continued in other countries (in the 1990s the Association des Élèves et Étudiants Musulmans du Burkina [Burkina Muslim Pupils' and Students' Association] and the Centre d'Études, de Recherches et de Formation Islamique [Centre for Islamic Studies, Research and Training] in Burkina Faso). An Islamic newspaper, *Plume libre*, appeared in Côte d'Ivoire in 1992 and *an-Nasr* in January 2004 in Burkina Faso. But most of the Islamic newspapers that were in printed in the 1980s are no longer produced because of financial problems (such as in Senegal and in Côte d'Ivoire). In fact, Islam increased its visibility in the media with the more regular and prominent broadcast of religious shows on the radio and the television;[11] the broad distribution of sermons on audio- and video-cassettes;[12] posters of clothing sporting the likeness of different preachers; a significant increase in the number of Islamic bookstores; and a new emphasis on clerics from around the world. All of these developments represented 'the circulation of religious knowledge within unregulated networks'.[13] The new element lay in the emergence of religious mass movements like the Moustarchidines in Senegal, and in the great increase in sermons delivered at large gatherings held at locations like stadiums. Protest marches became much more frequent, such as those held in reaction to world events like the Gulf War or the

events of 11 September 2001, but also those organized in opposition to certain government measures like the eviction of residents from Zangouettin, a neighborhood in central Ouagadougou.

The Muslim had become both an activist for Islam and a missionary, roles which were reinforced in the 1990s when proselytism or *da'wa* was placed at the centre of a new strategy. The aim was for Islam 'to be everywhere at all times', 'to be present in, if not to dominate the public sphere', 'to present the message in such a way that it was accessible to all' and 'to enlarge Islamic space' so that the state would have no choice but to take notice. Many regulations adopted by Islamic associations underscored the importance of the *da'wa* and *wa'zi* (public study sessions).[14] In this context, mosques became important centers for political expression and were transformed into veritable complexes housing dispensaries, schools if not *madrasa*, and Arab literacy programs. Meanwhile, Islamic vacation destinations were established where children learned ablution and prayer while studying the Qur'an and the *hadith*.

Several factors help explain such a religious revival. The first set are internal and relate to the manner in which each society reacted to the failure of state policies, to various economic crises (the collapse of the coffee and cocoa markets in Côte d'Ivoire or the peanut crisis in Senegal, for example) and to student and social movements. The state was no longer able to satisfy the social and religious needs of the population. During the 1990s the process of democratization was 'a sign of normalization, that is the reflection of a sociological reality long hidden by an authoritarian power that could not deal with it without threatening its own survival'[15] in Niger and Mali. It generally tended to exacerbate identity-based demands and make them more politicized. These movements were made more visible by a new-found freedom of expression and by the expansion of television, radio and video, thanks to the arrival of inexpensive electronics imported from Asia. This opening of the airwaves also allowed for a wider broadcast of ideas and the circulation of translated texts and preachers. Meanwhile, the states in question withdrew from several sectors of the economy in favor of private interests, and fell even deeper into crisis following the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 and the application of the Structural Adjustment Plans (SAP). The accelerated privatization

of the economy and of education contributed to a new commodification of religion. A large part of the population was disappointed with the broken promises that had accompanied democratization and wanted to increase the credibility of Islam as a viable alternative in the public sphere.

This religious revival also reflected the fact that, since the 1980s, there had been greater diversity of Islamic activists and leaders. The new religious dynamics made room for the marginalized—the uneducated youth represented by the Association des Jeunes Musulmans de Côte d'Ivoire [Association of Young Muslims of Côte d'Ivoire]; socially disadvantaged women in Mali; readers of religious pamphlets written in Arabic, French or other national languages giving instructions on how to be a 'good Muslim',[16] the Arabic-speaking groups in Burkina Faso who were of 'low social status' and 'were second-class intellectuals'[17]—but did not do so exclusively. They were also the work of individuals who were conscious of the importance of speaking French for their commercial activities (the patrons of the *Yan-Izala* movement in Maradi, Niger)[18] and for relations with the state. Or they saw the importance of the Arab-French bilingualism, having been trained in both the Qur'anic and Arabic systems and their Western counterparts (*Adini Islam* sought to 'rehabilitate and make use of the Franco-Prabic upper managers';[19] the founders of the JIR;[20] Sidy Lamine Niasse, founder of *Wal Fadjri*,[21] as well as some pilgrims from Côte d'Ivoire were identified as 'a new set of Islamic clerics. (...) locally acknowledged as *ulamah*';[22] Al Hadj Idriss Koudouss Koné, president of the CNI, was trained at the École Nationale d'Administration Publique [National School of Public Administration] in Rabat;[23] in Niger, Cheikh Boureïma Abdou Daouda gave sermons in French and in Arabic).[24] This group created links with certain older Islamic activists (Cheikh Touré, founding president of the UCM in 1953, was known for his Islamic radicalism).[25] During the 1950s they had pursued their studies almost exclusively in North Africa or Egypt. But although Egypt remained a preferred destination, the location of their studies diversified between the 1970s and the 1990s to include Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Europe and the United States. These dynamics were also visible in francophone milieus: Latif Gueye;[26] the newspaper *Iqra* founded by intellectuals, univer-

sity professors, engineers, physicians, professors from secondary schools and colleges who trained in Western schools; certain pilgrims from Côte d'Ivoire;[27] the founders of the AEMUD in Dakar; or the founders of the CERFI in Ouagadougou who targeted francophone civil servants. They could also be found within the Brotherhoods (those of Cheikh Touré, Latif Gueye of the *Tidjaniyya*, Sidy Lamine Niasse from the Niassènes family,[28] the ARCI founded by three grand *cheikhs* of the *Tidjaniyya* in Niger.[29] Finally, the world of business was also involved[30] (*Al-Falah*[31], the patrons of the *Yan-Izala* movement in Maradi).[32]

Meanwhile, bilingual and francophone citizens became active within the Islamic movement. Their strategies were more in line with trade globalization, neo-liberalism and modernity. Some prominent imams were able to manipulate the media with great success and learned how to capture the attention of uneducated followers while playing on the emotions of their audience.[33]

In parallel, world events accelerated the process of self-affirmation initiated by the Muslim communities under study. As Westerlund noted: 'Certainly the oil boom and its financial and psychological consequences has been an important factor. [...] It should be noted, furthermore, that the influence of foreign powers may also have a divisive and weakening effect on the Islamist movement'.[34] For example, in Niger during the 1980s and 1990s, there was an ongoing battle for influence between Libya and Saudi Arabia and between Kuwait and Iran.[35] The Islamic Revolution 'inspired an intensification of Islamic practice in many Muslim societies'[36] and was seen at the time as the beginning of a serious political project, although today this is no longer true.[37] By contrast, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War are themes which highlight the fault lines within West-African Islamic movements.

Discourse and Strategies: Continuity and Change

Criticism of secularism was a constant in discourse although it varied significantly from one country to the next. In Senegal, this debate was the focus of media attention throughout the 1980s. From its inception, the magazine *Djamra* attacked secularism much like the newspaper *Wal Fadjri*, up until the departure of its managing

editor Latif Gueye in the mid-1980s. From the end of the 1980s, the strategy changed: a direct critique of the concept was abandoned in favor of a socio-cultural critique of the practice of secularism.

Three arguments were used against secularism. First, that such a principle had no place in a country where the majority of the population was Muslim. Second, they argued that it had been imported and imposed by French colonial power and continued to be the norm after independence and up to the present day. Finally, that it promoted the separation of religion and politics when, in fact, states used Islam to their own ends.

The critique of the foundations of the state and of its instrumentalist approach to Islam also evolved significantly from one decade to the next, with Senegal being the first country where the Islamic movement in francophone Africa turned its attention to politics. To begin with, there was the creation of the JIR, which broke away from the UCM because 'Islam wasn't being lived in its entirety' and because the association was increasingly becoming a mouthpiece for pro-government propaganda. Furthermore there was the secret creation of an Islamic party in 1979 by Ahmed Khalifa Niasse. This signaled an awakening on the part of Muslim political actors who wished to upset the political balance in their favor. Following this isolated success (Ahmed Khalifa Niasse went into exile after August 1979, and later re-emerged on the government side, going so far as to support Abdou Diouf during the 1993 elections) and given the state's ability to pursue a rather ambiguous Islamic policy (allowing the anti-secularism debate to carry so long as it did not threaten public order; increasing openness to the Arab world; banning the importation, distribution and sale of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* with a decree issued on 24 February 1989), the plan was to stay out of electoral politics and abstain from voting until the 1988 presidential elections. The reverse occurred in Burkina Faso and in Mali at the beginning of the 1980s. Muslim reformers, most of whom were Arabic-speaking, held that Sankara's revolutionary project corresponded to God's will, all the while believing that they had to go even further to establish a social order based on the Qur'an.[38] In Mali, Oumar S. Touré, the first director of the Centre pour la promotion de la langue Arabe [Centre for the Promotion of the Arabic Language], a fervent defender of the nationalization

of the *madaris*, stood in opposition to his father, Saad Touré, founder of the first *madrasa* in Mali and kept his distance from the colonial administration and later the independent state.[39]

In 1988 a change occurred in Senegal; Islamic leaders did not call for the creation of a legally-recognized Islamic party but instead agreed to pressure existing political parties to take a stand on a society governed by Islamic values and institutions. In this vein, a first Islamic declaration was written during the JIR's fourth congress (September 1988). Later, a coalition of associations was formed to declare that Islam 'is a global religion, that it is both a spiritual and material vocation, and that consequently it embraces all aspects of the individual's life and that of humanity'. Nevertheless, support for this position was not unanimous: *Al Falah* did not participate in the initiative. In 1993, during the presidential elections, the Islamists entered the political arena by releasing a platform clearly listing their demands on matters social, political, economic and religious. They called on all candidates to take a position with regard to the platform and called on young voters to reject the street violence which had broken out following the announcement of the results of the 1988 presidential elections. A radicalization of religious life was notably evident in the speech given on 13 February 1993 by Moustapha Sy, the young Marabout manager of the *dahira Moustarchidatines*.[40]

During the 1990s, the battle against the state might appear to have moved underground. The fact that certain Islamic leaders were civil servants might suggest that their freedom of action was limited, but this was irrelevant. For their role as preachers came before all other considerations for this new generation of Muslims. 'The new Islamic intellectual could not be controlled by the state in his social being. Socially, he was not what he appeared, his profession did not define him'.[41] Regardless, the battle against state secularism was launched once again following the election of Abdoulaye Wade as president in 2000 and his initial decision to take the word 'secular' out of the constitution in January 2001. A Groupe d'initiative pour le référendum sur l'application de la loi Islamique [Working Group for the Referendum on the Application of Islamic Law] (GIPRALIS) coordinated by Mouhammad Niang was created to write a new constitution. In Niger, the AIN

denounced 'the backward step in Islamic values' and criticized the secular foundations of the constitution adopted on 26 December 1992,[42] given that Muslims formed an overwhelming majority of the country's citizens.

In other countries too, Islam became a subject of national political debate in the context of the democratization process. During the Conférence nationale [National Convention] of August 1991 in Mali, there was a movement in opposition to the ban on religious political parties. One of the arguments used against the new constitution was: 'The Qur'an is our best constitution. Vote no on any other constitution!'[43] Indeed, a similar link had been established between the introduction of multi-party politics and the rise in the visibility of Islamic associations in Côte d'Ivoire,[44] and between the end of the long emergency regime of 1974–1987 and the religious revival in Niger. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Muslim associations, which had been discrete if not passive before December 1993 (death of Houphouët-Boigny), became involved in political debates. The mosques of the Lycée Technique d'Abdjan, of the Riviera II, of Aghien, and of the Riviera Golf: 'were recognized as vectors for the transmission of the political positions of the Muslim community. ... Their policy positions dealt with the anti-Muslim measures, problems related to "ivoirité" and the question of the foreign nationals in the North. They openly accused the political authorities of wanting to destroy the energy of Islam and of making Muslims into second-class citizens'.[45] The electoral law of November 1994, which prevented foreigners from voting, and the constitution of 21 July 2000 were actively vilified and Al Hadj Idriss Koudouss moved to the forefront.[46] Also, the separation of religious and political matters was actively criticized by certain Islamic movements in Niger.[47]

The evolution of the positions taken in relation to the state, shows these movements needed the state.[48] They recognized that the state was incontrovertible and that it would be counterproductive to disregard it. However, the legitimacy of the state was sometimes questioned more directly, as when two associations in Niger raised the matter of introducing *Shari'a*. In 1999—the Organisation Islamique Nigérienne de Boubacar El Hadj Issa [Islamic Organization of Niger in Boubacar El Hadj Issa] and the Association pour la

culture et l'éducation Islamique de Souleymane Imam Younous [Association for Islamic Culture and Education of Souleymane Imam Younous]. Or the state's legitimacy could be questioned in a less direct manner when the Qur'an was declared to be a central model, a guiding text which could overcome the economic, social and ideological failures that had plagued the African states since their independence. Some authors have argued that because of the limits placed on the democratic process (endemic corruption and nepotism, enduring economic crisis) there emerged 'outlet' strategies[49] that involved focusing on activities on the social front (such as donations of blood, clothing, food).

The entire Islamic movement was conscious of the fact that political Islam could emerge if only society as a whole perfectly understood and followed religious precepts. A complete transformation of the social landscape was an unavoidable prerequisite. This is why, throughout these two decades, and regardless of the group in question, certain issues were regularly alluded to in speeches: moral decline, the superficial practice of the faith and the Westernization of morals. Frequent calls were made for a return to traditional values and for moral reform: honesty, solidarity, and work; the closing of bars; the fight against prostitution, corruption, juvenile delinquency, and women's clothing considered indecent; mothers educating their children. In several countries, reforms to the Code of Family Law (Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) inspired stormy debates and virulent opposition campaigns. The document was even referred to as the 'Women's Code' to signify that it was anti-Islamic insofar as it supported monogamy and sought to reform relations between spouses with regard to inheritance. It was also considered imperialist because it supported Western concepts of family and gender relations. The fight against the reform of family law and against a ban on female circumcision was so virulent that in Mali the state backed down in 2002;[50] it is the same case in Niger.[51] In Senegal, the Comité Islamique pour la Réforme du Code de la Famille au Sénégal [Islamic Committee for the Reform of the Code of Family Law in Senegal] (CIRCOFS) was created with the participation of Al Falah, JIR, OAI and AEMUD. The committee denounced certain anti-Islamic elements of the text and proposed specific amendments to various articles according to the principles of the Qur'an.

Negative comments directed against women, blaming them for all sorts of deprivations and social problems (such as a lack of rain during winter), became increasingly common and normal as such messages were widely broadcast on radio and television during the 1990s. In Niger, a movement was formed to oppose the campaign for family planning and the prevention of AIDS, initiatives which were considered anti-Islamic.[52] Their next initiative was to unsuccessfully oppose the ratification of the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1999, portraying it as an act of 'prostitution' as well as the holding of the Festival of African Fashion in Niamey in November 2000.[53] In Niger also, Islamist women contested the feminist vision of women's rights when the Quota Act[54] became effective on 28 February 2001.[55]

According to these groups, this also explains how the breakdown of society was caused by a poor understanding of Islam and of its fundamental principles by all Muslims. These groups rejected all belief in spirit possession, in ghosts, or in amulets. This is why they regularly denounced *dhikr* sessions (collective sessions for reciting payers) where there was a notable association made between the names of the founder of the Brotherhood, those of the subsequent Caliphs, and that of the Prophet Muhammed. According to them, the Brotherhoods bore a great share of the responsibility for the lack of unity within the community. By attacking the Brotherhoods, these groups placed themselves in a position to challenge the former's monopoly. Thus, they declared themselves to be the faithful and cautious interpreters of the texts that informed their beliefs. During the 1980s, criticism of the Brotherhoods was more muted in Senegal, a reflection of pragmatism within these groups. In order to reach a broader audience, efforts were made to cooperate with the Brotherhoods and evoked the founders of the Brotherhoods when preaching resistance to colonialism. The groups realized that it was difficult to directly attack the power of the Brotherhoods and socio-religious realities forced them to temper their discourse. At the same time, the Brotherhoods were conscious of the fact that the Islamic associations provided them with a means of reaching new social segments of the urban population, especially the youth. By contrast, in Niger, Salafi Islam remained

opposed to the Islamic Brotherhood of *tariqa Tidjaniyya*[56] as in Burkina Faso, where Arabic-speaking activists condemned 'the "ignorance" of the traditionalists (...) for claiming as legitimate the power to which they aspired'.[57]

Special treatment was given to international affairs and the situation of Muslims around the world. It is through these questions that the polymorphic nature of the discourse becomes apparent. In Niger, the newspaper *Iqra* analyzed the Qur'an and Sufi practices, attacked secularism, discussed Sayyid Qutb, condemned the *Satanic Verses*, called for moral reform (to be achieved by giving women a central role), and both stated and implied that it was allied with the authorities. In Senegal, the AEMUD followed in the footsteps of the JIR by translating excerpts from Sayyid Qutb's *Milestones on the Road*. Qutb was seen as the father of all dissenting Islamic movements of the 1970s. In Niger, 'the label "modernist Islam" referred just as much to radical Islamists as to the modernists Ibn Taymiyya, Mohamed Ben Abdelwahab, Hassane Al Banna, Sayyed Qutb, Abul A'la Maudud, Ahmed Deedat, Tariq Ramadan etc'.[58] It is the same in Senegal and in Burkina Faso.

Continuity emerged from the discourse during the 1980s and 1990s. Praise for the Iranian revolution was common in Islamic newspapers during the period insofar as the Ayatollah Khomeini personified the rejection of the West, was portrayed as a spiritual guide who helped make Islam a potent political force on the eve of the twentieth century, and acted as the leader who made possible a return to a more authentic version of Islam. From June to October 1984, *Wal Fadjri* published the *Manifeste de l'État Islamique* [Manifesto of the Islamic State] written by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In the same way, the rise of the Front Islamique du salut [Islamic Salvation Front] in Algeria in December 1991 was seen as part of a global 'awakening of the Islamic consciousness. Bin Laden also attracted attention for his defiance of the West to the point that youth opposed to evictions in the Zangouettin neighborhood formed a group with the same name. However these references did not necessarily indicate a total allegiance to the thinking of these leaders. Rather, they showed that West Africans were keen to listen to ideological debates across the *umma* and were impressed by the media profile these international leaders had achieved. Muslims in the

region were also inspired by local and regional religious leaders and notably by the jihad carried on in West Africa during the nineteenth century.

But when diplomatic games and struggles for influence between Arab-Muslim countries took place, the *umma* was divided because of 'divergent interpretations of the facts'.[59] The reading of the Gulf War by the Islamic press in Senegal provides a good example. For *Jamra, Al-Falah*, the retreat of Iraqi troops from Kuwait was essential, Saddam Hussein was wrong to have invaded Kuwait, and the arrival of Western troops was the most acceptable solution. For the AEMUD, the monarchies of the Gulf were guilty of being on the same side as the West and Saddam Hussein was criticized for his 1991 invasion of Kuwait, despite his jihadist stances, because it has led to an enduring American presence in the region and near the sacred sites of Islam. For the JIR, the arrival of Western troops was unacceptable because they had come to defend Kuwait—not for humanitarian reasons but for strategic and economic ones. Following this watershed event, opposition to the United States was reinforced by the imprisonments at Guantanamo Bay in January 1992 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. And opposition to Israel was made definitive with the election of Ariel Sharon in February 2001, the subsequent construction of a protective wall in the West Bank, and Israel's assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yassine (Hamas's spiritual leader) on 22 March 2004. Thus, international political developments having strong media impact and an 'ability to recruit'[60] were systematically analyzed by the West-African Islamic press.

In positioning themselves in relation to one another, the different Islamic associations continually called for a return to fundamental Islamic values through a return to the Qur'an and to the Sunna. Their calls for Muslim unity in order to create an exemplary community that would obey the Prophetic Message illustrates how they directly cast themselves as messengers of the Prophet, as guides and interpreters.[61] 'The pre-eminence of the Qur'an' was central to Islamic discourse.[62] Islam 'is not only a set of beliefs, it is an "all-encompassing order," a "total order," a *nizam*'.[63]

What changed in the 1990s was the increasingly central place given to cultural practice and a collective devotion to all aspects of

Islam. Prayer was both an act of consolidating one's individual faith and an act which reinforced the cohesion of the group.[64] Behaving like a 'good Muslim' as much through one's faith as one's behavior and style of dress were markers of identity and alternative or reformist postures, which came into conflict with 'the stereotype notion of "modernity" as "civilization" or "progress"'.[65] The *da'wa* also gained importance and became a central issue during the 1990s; this is why the control of the mosques became a major question. For example, the proliferation of mosques in Burkina Faso 'was the expression of internal crises, of rivalries between Islamic associations'.[66] Subsequently, the three main associations (CMBF, Mouvement Sunnite [Sunni Movement] and Association Islamique de la Tidjaniyya [Islamic Association of Tidjaniyya]) became more active because of the reorganization of urban space and the development of proselytism within the first two associations. The same situation developed in Côte d'Ivoire with the dynamic activities of the Conseil Supérieur des Imam [Superior Council of the Imams] (COSIM).[67] *Da'wa* caravans were used in the context of the proselytizing actions (AJMCI in Côte d'Ivoire and JIR in Senegal for instance).

In sum, the discourses of these groups considered the religious norm to be the only legitimate norm and progressively applied it to the world of politics. This 'globalized denunciation',[68] though sometimes radical, did not mean a constitution of a project for an Islamic state. Rather, it represented the cobbling together of ideological and cultural currents with a broad-based discourse which rejected the image of a 'black Islam' (a fixed image promoted by the colonial power) in favor of an Islam that was taking its place through a synthesis between its secular links with the rest of the Arab-Muslim world, its local characteristics and its internal dynamics. This new climate and these discourses illuminate the different logics of reconfiguration present within francophone West-African societies, where Muslims constituted a majority, while appreciating the ways in which this transformed individuals and the idea of citizenship.

The Reconstitution of Muslim Communities or the Emergence of a 'Civil Religion' in Francophone West Africa

As early as the 1980s, Islam had become an instrument for conquering new spaces, a quest for an alternative frame of reference to be established in opposition to that imposed by the state since the time of independence. The control of spaces was focused on certain strategic locations for the construction of mosques, such as university campuses, residential headquarters or airports (unfinished Yoff mosque in Dakar, Cocody-Riviera II Al-Nûr mosque in Abidjan, Port-Bouet Bilal mosque in Abidjan for instance). During the 1990s, this phenomenon accelerated as part of a process of the de-privatization of religion,[69] insofar as the common strategy of all branches of Islam in West Africa was to systematically increase their presence in the public sphere (space for the exchange of conflicting ideas and discourse). Thus, Islam removed itself from the private sphere, while Muslims active in the different movements and associations discussed above increasingly defined themselves first and foremost as Muslim citizens before being a citizen of a particular country. Their Muslim identity informed all of their daily activities. In this way, these Muslim citizens demanded more and more from a 'civil religion', from an Islamic patriotism rooted in the *umma*.

This Islamic posture brought about a greater visibility of the faith during the 1990s while linking individual experience with collective experience. Within this context there can be observed a phenomenon of overvaluing piety through the abandonment of all family attachments in order to fully live one's faith, or by repeatedly making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Young pilgrims in Côte d'Ivoire:

> claim a form of individuality, suggesting a modern self that lies between atomistic decision making and community obligations based on the universal notion of the *ummah*. Arabized selves correspond to claims for autonomous, emancipated subjects who seek to rework their belonging to alternative social worlds. The issue is to find new inscriptions within the collective order that blend individual and collective allegiances.[70]

This presentation of faith increasingly brought certain Muslims to target both symbolic and strategic spaces and also to contribute

to the emerging new ways of being Muslim. It was firstly a matter of being present in mass gathering places, popular and recreational sites like stadiums (Mali and Côte d'Ivoire) in the same manner as a Pentecostal movement. It was also a matter of Islamicizing modernity by targeting sites associated with the West, with finance, or with capitalism—such as luxury hotels—in order to show how the Islamic movement had no borders and how it had a great capacity for attracting converts in the widest variety of milieus. Furthermore, it was a matter of putting one's Islamic identity in this context of de-privatizing religion. For example, it was in this manner that the youth of the Zangouettin neighborhood (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso) targeted the street with their movement in opposition to the government's decision to evict the population of the neighborhood as part of the ZACA urban renewal project in 2001. They named their movement al-Qaeda in an attempt to attract the most media attention possible and also to highlight the differences between themselves and an older generation of Muslims which was more inclined to negotiate with the authorities.[71]

It was thus that access to state media also remained a central feature of the battle for increased legitimacy. In Niger:

> in August 1995, the president of the ANASI appealed to the president of the Superior Council of Communication to tell him that the ORTN (Office of Radio Diffusion and Television of Niger) decision was deliberate and amounted to the exclusion of certain infra-state communities from air time—in particular, the Haoussa (the largest linguistic group).[72]

It was in this way that the state chose to co-opt certain preachers to control their capacity for influence. For example, in Mali, Haïdara, after having been marginalized and pushed aside by the state and excluded from official media:

> very recently [...] has been admitted into a governmental committee on religious affairs. [...] Haidara's recent 'upgrade' in official status not only illustrates his successful 'reinvestment' of the symbolic capital he earned by his earlier criticism of institutional power but also demonstrates that religious and state authorities prefer to domesticate him through partial co-optation into the state apparatus, rather than letting him 'go loose' via audiocassettes and commercial radio stations.[73]

Once again, it is a question of knowing how to use the media in order to better publicize the religious message. It was in this way

that certain preachers became veritable stars, 'formidable leaders of opinion'[74] who competed with the state; religious entrepreneurs from the moment they learned how to use the media in the manner of 'U.S. televangelist preachers',[75] marshaling behind them scores of followers; gaining fame beyond the borders of their own country; and widely broadcasting their speeches on audio-cassettes to which many faithful listened piously.[76] Around these preachers, a new logic of the legitimization and construction of authority was created. It was no longer only the acquisition of foreign knowledge that was essential but also talent as an orator and charisma. The fact that some of these people had been granted a nickname by the media attests to their fame, such as in the case of 'Wulibali Haidara (Haidara who speaks the undeniable truth)'.[77] Beside this example drawn from Mali, there were other well-known imams in the past or in the present: Cheikh Youssouf Hassane Diallo among francophones; Malam Chaïbou in Niger, a regional trader who created around himself a network of *Izala* traders; El-Hadj Samassi ('popular amongst the Muslim inhabitants of both the Riviera II and Riviera III neighborhoods');[78] Mohamed Seyni Gorgui Guèye, the founding imam of the mosque known as having 'fallen from heaven' in Dakar; Mbaye Niang, imam of the unfinished Yoff mosque in Dakar; El Hadj Aboubacar Sana, imam of the grand mosque managed by the CMBF in Ouagadougou; the late El Hadj Ouedraogo Sayouba of the grand Friday mosque managed by the Sunni Movement in the Zangouettin neighborhood in Ouagadougou; Imam Kanté of the AEMUD; Imam Niang at the Point E mosque in Dakar; and the preachers organized by the Ligue des Prédicateurs [League of Preachers] in Côte d'Ivoire at Abidjan. The lines were occasionally blurred when, in occupying the public sphere, these different varieties of Islam replicated the relationship existing between political leaders and the population, notably during the single-party period or between leaders of the Brotherhood and the *tullab*. In Mali, for example, during the gatherings where Haïdara spoke, the faithful wore boubous in his likeness, kissed his hands, and touched him as he passed.[79] These practices help to highlight new religious behaviors, as well as new forms of legitimacy and loyalty.

This Islamic mobilization, through the consumption of religious products, was facilitated and made more active. 'Because of their

participatory and interactive formula, talk radio programs capture the moral imagination of listeners. The new, morally evaluating public they create and address illustrates that new forms of sociality emerge in and around practices of broadcast consumption'.[80] The modalities of the acquisition of religious knowledge were profoundly changed because the distribution of sermons on cassette removed the necessity of the presence of an intermediary. Each individual could customize their religious knowledge according to the quality of their listening, their comprehension of the content of the cassette, and the frequency with which they listened. This knowledge also mixed the preoccupations of each individual consumer of the cassette with those of the community as a whole because this medium could be accessed with friends, with neighbors, with members of an association, in the street, at the market, or during tea. Henceforth the cassette had several virtues: affordable, it was accessible to all; it was a pedagogical and proselytizing tool that was both accessible and banal, leading to a new sociability around religion and encouraging the emergence of a new social and cultural order, anchored in peoples' everyday lives. This commodification of the religious led to the emergence of competing preachers, which led to a new period of oratorical 'one-upmanship' during the 1990s. Moreover this commodification led to the constitution of 'a polycentric field of debate' and 'a marketplace of ideas'.[81]

Alongside this control of public space there developed a new freedom of speech which disrupted relations between elders and youth, between women and men, between society and the state. The generational conflict is often evoked because the emergence of a new generation of Muslims is understood as 'the objectification of Muslim consciousness' among many Muslims. For example, in Niger, a new generation of Muslims having completed the pilgrimage (the *alhazai*), activists from the *Izala* reform movement in Maradi, considered that 'Hausa society is too hierarchical, and consequently they challenge the power and authority of the elders. For example, they do not kneel in the presence of their father, mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law or any person who must be respected because of age or social status'.[82] The same observation was made in Zinder, with the emergence of young Muslim reform-

ers who had studied in Arab countries. In Côte d'Ivoire, participation in radical movements reflected a desire to counter the power of the gerontocracy and against arranged marriages.[83] In Burkina Faso, young members of al-Qaeda stood opposed to the older generation, the latter belonging to a traditionalist branch of Islam and being ready to negotiate with the state. In Senegal, the JIR was created as a counterweight to the UCM, which had become a facilitator for the transmission of the Muslim politics of the authorities.

Nevertheless, other examples show how, beginning in the 1980s, the older generation worked together with youth on Islamic action. During the 1990s, with the central importance given to proselytism, bridges were established between youth and elders in the mosques. The power of the gerontocracy was renegotiated and remodeled. Neighborhood youth—known for their knowledge of the Qur'an—were called on by their elders to help spread the word about the Friday sermon in Dakar and in Ouagadougou.[84] It was also possible to observe a new way of managing relations between men and women within marriage. Three related elements needed to be present, namely active participation in neighborhood Islamic associations or in NGOs; accepting social codes or affirming the choice of following them; and the participation in the marriage market by choosing a spouse. In Mali, the success of the *madaris* shows the extent to which there was a strong desire to transmit religious knowledge, which assured a certain social status and made public speaking easier.

The distinction between associations friendly to the state and those who were not became less clear because of the liberalization of the airwaves. For example in Mali, the *ulama*'s radio aired more dissenting programs following the arrival of Arabic-speaking youth at the Bureau des ulama [Office of the *Ulama*] opposed to the methods of the AMUPI[85] and once the speeches of Haïdara appeared less virulent against the State. At the same time, a too-hegemonic state was pushed aside, rivaled, and could no longer control this brand of Islam which presented religion as the 'public norm'[86] and which widely spread its ideas via the 'small media'.[87]

In this context, a new relationship developed between civil society and the state.[88] In making this argument, this chapter contradicts the studies which argue that there was no civil society on the

African continent insofar as the state had annexed civil society. I concur with those authors who analyze the 'multiple methods of bypassing, avoiding and subverting by which society manages to erode the domination of the state'[89] and who consider 'civil society' as an 'intermediary space', 'an advanced space of society in the political field capable of detotalitarianizing the state', 'a site of interaction and negotiation between state and society'.[90] The battle against the proposed Code of Family Law in Mali provides a good example. It reveals how a part of civil society, within the neighborhood associations of Muslim women opposed to the reform, fought against the idea that the state would defend a notion of the nuclear family and would interfere in family relations, but also sought official recognition insofar as these women participated in the debate and took their place within the public sphere after having been marginalized by the regimes that had followed the fall of Moussa Traoré.[91] Ultimately, the picture was increasingly one of a civil society that was building regions of autonomy with the presence of charismatic religious leaders, anchored in the social fabric and having mastered modern technologies, with social groups which spoke publicly and did not hesitate to affirm their positions within tense political contexts (the question of 'ivoirité' in Côte d'Ivoire, for example).

The great increase in the number of Islamic organizations illustrates how the Islamic revival remains a vital force and how political Islam retains the capacity to gain ground and increase the number of its followers, especially among the young, women, and the educated. Political Islam, even if it does not yet represent a viable alternative and remains in the minority, is attractive 'not only because it offers modes of being and belonging, but also because it constructs new imaginations of the community and the individual'.[92] It also carries out a significant amount of social work by approaching a range of social groups, has become an important participant in local socio-political debates (on secularism, on family law), and remains connected to international affairs and geo-political issues.

Although in the minority and sometimes radical, if not intolerant for example, in (riots in Niger, skirmishes between members of *Al-Falah* and the followers of the tidjanes, campus violence between

members of the JIR and the mourides in Dakar), political Islam is to a certain extent representative of a civil society which, by the opinions it expresses, is anchored within both the local and global contexts. Indeed, civil society manifests a clear attachment to the *umma* (whence the declarations of solidarity with the people of Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq); an opposition to globalization, insofar as the latter is associated with the hegemonic policies of the United Sates, and to the impoverishment of the world's population. It also actively works toward a strong and united Islam which remains an important source of collective identity.

The rise of political Islam might suggest that certain countries are in the midst of difficult situations which might get worse in the medium term. Certain radical positions reveal the extent to which Muslim societies in francophone West Africa are torn by questions of identity or even communitarianism. But at the same time, these radical positions are sometimes also damaging to political Islam, serving to alienate either the general population (in Senegal, religious candidates were rejected by the population in the presidential elections of 2000) or the state itself (in Niger, the blocking of the adoption of the Code of Family Law was mostly a sign of the state's timidity to attack social conservatism). Political Islam has also lost battles such as that over the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in Niger in August 1999, and over the revision of national constitutions which retained the principle of secularism.

Meanwhile, the leaders of political Islam need the State, despite their opposition to government policy. As a result, the question is whether political Islam will present itself as a new political alternative—as an alternative model of civilization. None of the movements discussed above, with only a few exceptions and despite their very critical discourses on the policies of their respective states, aimed to break away and seize power by force. They continued to respect the rules laid out by the existing political system, and did not advocate a withdrawal or exile (*hijra*) which could have led to the establishment of a different social model through violence. Nor did they advocate civil disobedience. Most of these movements sought to change society by reforming it from within. They sought to interpret reality and construct an alternative reality

by contesting the status quo, but without inciting revolution. Very often their speeches were prefaced by recognition that the societies in question were not yet ready to live under a purely Islamic state, in order to explain that the introduction of *Shari'a* was not yet possible. In fact, by building bilingual Franco-Arabic schools and by organizing conferences on the foundations of Islam, they showed the extent to which they were reformers but not revolutionaries, ultimately showing little interest for the actual exercise of power.

Fundamentally, because of its heterogeneous nature, its moralizing speeches, and its capacity for using the media to capture the attention of the population, regardless of age or social status, political Islam has proven capable of bringing together collective imaginations, of anchoring religion at the center of debates, of making the divine an essential element of political life and life in general. Through its activism, this brand of Islam has redefined relations between generations, between men and women. It has unshackled religion by taking it out of the private sphere and placing it squarely in the public sphere. Because of all this, it provides a lens through which to view the major changes that have swept across the Muslim communities of francophone West Africa and civil societies more generally during the last twenty-five years.

7

THE 'OTHER' POLITICAL ISLAM

UNDERSTANDING SALAFI POLITICS

Martijn de Koning

In November 2007 the Dutch newspaper *De Telegraaf* published an article about the plans of Dutch radical anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders to release a 'provoking' film named *Fitna* about the Qur'an. This caused quite a stir in Dutch society. One of the voices in this debate was the Tawheed mosque, a Salafi mosque in Amsterdam.[1] The youth chapter of this mosque wrote an open letter to Dutch parliament claiming that Geert Wilders' right to freedom of speech was violating the right to freedom of religion for Muslims. The writers also stated that Wilders' 'offending' statements about Islam were detrimental to the integration of Muslims in society. They called upon the members of parliament to take the necessary steps to point out to Wilders the negative consequences of this film. The writers stated that this is the task of parliament since it is elected by the majority of the people and in a democracy the voice of the people is one of the most important constituent elements. The voice of minorities, so they wrote, should also be heard in order to have their interests defended in a respectful and acceptable manner.

Often the Salafi movement is seen as a cultural movement without a clear political program, which shies away from becoming

references on the concepts of Islamism, political Islam, neo-fundamentalism or post-Islamism see the Introduction to this volume.

9. Jean-Noël Ferrié, *Le Régime de la civilité. Public et réislamislamisation en Egypte*, Paris: CNRS, 2004, p. 15.
10. Jocelyne Cesari, *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe And in the United States*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.
11. In francophone Europe, Islamic preachers, such as Tariq Ramadan and Hassan Iquioussen, who were born in Europe or arrived at a young age and were inheritors of the original Islamist codes, embody this diffused re-Islamization. Despite the restricted number of members in their immediate circle of activists, the identification that they generate among young Muslims structures a large part of the process of re-Islamization, without the preachers having to directly supervise the process.
12. Romain Garbaye, *Getting Into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
13. Amel Boubekeur, 'Islam and Women's rights: Empowerment of a new Islamic Elite, *New Voices, New Perspectives Program*, UN—INSTRAW, March 2006.
14. John Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
15. These actors play essential roles in the Islamist philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), an Egyptian intellectual, conceptualised the revolutionary, and even violent, use of Islam in contemporary politics. Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), also Egyptian, is the founder of the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1925–) is a theologian and president of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR).
16. For an analysis of these relations, see Amel Boubekeur, *La voile de la mariée. Jeunes musulmanes, voile et projet matrimonial en France*, Paris: l'Harmattan, 2004.
17. For a more in-depth exploration of the arts in the process of re-Islamization and the renewal of the committed Islamic spirit, see Amel Boubekeur, 'Post-Islamist culture: A new form of Mobilization?' *History of Religion*, vol. 47, no. 1, 2007.
18. This term is taken from Khadija Mohsen-Finan, 'La mise en avant d'une citoyenneté croyant: le cas de Tariq Ramadan', in Rémy Leveau, Catherine Withol de Wenden and Khadija Mohsen-Finan (eds), *De la Citoyenneté locale*, Paris: Ifri, 2003.
19. Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
20. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed, Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 85. The exact quote refers to Islam, this author has replaced it with Islamist re-Islamization.

21. 'Notabilization' occurs through the institutionalization of a certain number of Islamist activists within State representative councils of Muslims in Europe.
22. Moreover the feeling of being locked into an activist career for life explains the following statement from one of our interviewees: 'It's always the same: what do you think about polygamy, lapidation, Iran? OK! Being Muslim isn't our job!'
23. Armando Salvatore, *The Public Sphere: Liberal Modernity, Catholicism, Islam*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
24. Tariq Modood, *Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
25. Olivier Roy, *Secularism Confronts Islam*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
26. Jørgen S. Nielsen, *Towards a European Islam: Migration, Minorities and Citizenship*, London: Macmillan, 1999.
27. Amel Boubekeur, 'Time to Deradicalise? The European Roots of Muslim Radicalisation', *The International Spectator*, vol. XLIII, no. 3, July-September 2008.
28. In the Sufi tradition, the *murshid* designates the spiritual guide of the brotherhood. For the Muslim Brotherhood, this function was institutionalized as the general guide of the organization.
29. See Amel Boubekeur, 'Cool and Competitive. New Muslim Culture in the West', *ISIM Newsletter*, no. 16, Autumn 2005.
30. An Algerian philosopher (1905–1973) who was involved with reformist Islam, he was one of the principal sources of inspiration for Algerian Islamism. According to Bennabi 'Colonizability' represents the state of decadence (of Islamic thought) which made the colonization of Muslim peoples possible.
31. John Holloway, *Change the World Without Taking Power, The Meaning of Revolution Today*, London: Pluto Press, 2002.

6. POLITICAL ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA FROM THE 1980s TO THE PRESENT

1. The posture of crossing one's hands on the chest after each prostration of the ritual prayer was adopted in a context of a struggle for power in the mosques of French Sudan, see Paul Triaud, 'Le mouvement réformiste en Afrique de l'Ouest dans les années 1950', *Mémoires du CERMAA*, vol. 1, 1979, pp. 195–212; and Lansiné Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic reform and politics in French West Africa*, Evanston: Northwestern Uni-

versity Press, 1974. On the other hand, the administration identified them as reformers.

2. Fédération des Associations Islamiques Sénégalaises [Federation of Islamic Senegalese Associations] (FAIS) on 6 October 1962 in Senegal, the Communauté Musulmane de la Haute-Volta [Muslim Community of Upper-Voltam in 1962 (renamed Communauté Musulmane du Burkina Faso in 1973), Association Islamique du Niger [Islamic Association of Niger] (AIN) formed on 15 August 1974 on the initiative of Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountché in power. This association 'up until 1992, [...] not only had a monopoly on granting official authorization to give the waazi (sermon to the marabouts), but also the power to control the activities of each marabout', see Olivier Meunier, *Dynamique de l'enseignement Islamique au Niger*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997, p. 172. Also the Association Malienne pour l'Unité et le Progrès de l'Islam [Malian Association for the Unity and Progress of Islam] (AMUPI) in 1980.
3. In Mali, 'there were in 1974 about ten (Islamic) radio programmes [...]. I can state that in 1975, the Islamic programmes were perfected and perfectly integrated into the regular radio programs' and 'from July 1987, the listings included, as with the radio, regular, special and one-time programmes as well as religious songs', Biritou Sanankoua and Louis Brenner, (eds), *L'enseignement Islamique au Mali*, Bamako: Jamana, 1991, pp. 134–135). The same author discusses the success of the special program *'Rencontre avec les ulama'* [Meet the *Ulama*].
4. For Niger, see Abdoulaye Niandou Souley and Gado Alzouma, 'Islamic Renewal in Niger: from Monolith to Plurality', *Social Compass*, vol. 43, no. 2, 1996, p. 254.
5. See Muriel Gomez-Perez, *L'Islam politique au sud du Sahara. Identités, discours et enjeux*, Paris: Karthala, 2005; and Muriel Gomez-Perez, 'Généalogie de l'Islam réformiste au Sénégal des années 50 à nos jours: figures, savoirs et réseaux', in Laurent Fourchard, André Mary and René Otayek (eds), *Entreprises religieuses transnationales en Afrique de l'Ouest*, Paris: Karthala, 2005, pp. 193–222.
6. See Muriel Gomez-Perez, 'The Association des Étudiants Musulmans de l'Université de Dakar (AEMUD): Between the Local and the Global. An analysis of Discourse', *Africa today*, vol. 54, issue 3, Spring 2008, pp. 95–117.
7. See Christian Coulon, *Les musulmans et le pouvoir en Afrique noire*, Paris: Karthala, 1983, pp. 171–172.
8. On Senegal, see the works of Erin Augis: 'Jambaar or Jumbax-out? How Sunnite Women negotiate power and belief in Othodox Islamic Femininity', in Mamadou Diouf and Mara Leichtman (eds), *New perspectives*

on Islam in Senegal: Conversion, Migration, Wealth, Power and Femininity, London: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2009, pp. 210–233; idem., 'Les jeunes femmes Sunnites et la liberalization économique Dakar', *Afrique Contemporaine*, vol. 231, 2009, pp. 79–98; idem., 'Dakar's Sunnite Women: the Politics of Person', Muriel Gomez-Perez, (ed.), *L'Islam politique au sud du Sahara*, pp. 309–326; idem., *Dakar's Sunnite Women: The Politics of Person*, PhD Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 2002. On Côte d'Ivoire, see Marie-Nathalie LeBlanc, '*Imaniya* and Young Muslim Women in Côte d'Ivoire', *Anthropologica*, vol. 49, 2007, pp. 35–50; and idem., 'Fashion and the politics of identity: Versioning Womanhood and Muslimhood in the face of tradition and Modernity', *Africa*, vol. 70, no. 3, 2000a, pp. 443–481. On Niger, see, for example, Ousseina Alidou and Hussana Alidou, 'Women, Religion and the discourses of legal ideology in Niger Republic', *Africa today*, vol. 54, issue 3, Spring 2008, pp. 21–36; and Masquelier, *Women and Islamic revival in a West African town*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
9. Between 1991 and 2000, fifty Islamic associations were officially recognized in Niger; see Souley Hassane, 'Les nouvelles élites Islamiques du Niger et du Nigeria du Nord. Itinéraires et prédications fondatrices (1950–2003)', in Fourchard, Mary and René Otayek (eds), *Entreprises religieuses et transnationales en Afrique de l'Ouest*, p. 141. Among the most typical examples were the Association pour la diffusion de l'Islam au Niger [Association for the Dissemination of Islam in Niger] (Adini-Islam), the Association pour le rayonnement de la Culture islamique [Association for the Spread of Islamic Culture] (ARCI), Association Nigérienne pour l'Appel à la Solidarité Islamique [Niger Association of the Call for Islamic Solidarity] (ANAUSI).
10. The Conseil National Islamique [National Islamic Council] was created in 1993; the Conseil Supérieur des imams de Côte d'Ivoire [Côte d'Ivoire Superior Council of Imams] was created in 1988, received its agreement in 1991, it was the same for the Ligue Islamique des prédicateurs de Côte d'Ivoire [Islamic League of Preachers of Côte d'Ivoire]. The Association des jeunes Musulmans de Côte d'Ivoire [Association of Young Muslims of Côte d'Ivoire] was created in 1992, the *Conseil National Islamique* [National Islamic Council] (CNI) in 1993 and the Association des Femmes Musulmanes de Côte d'Ivoire [Association of Muslim Women of Côte d'Ivoire] (AFMCI) in 1994. See also Marie Miran, *Islam, histoire et modernité en Côte d'Ivoire*, Paris: Karthala, 2006, Marie-Nathalie LeBlanc, 'Proclaiming Individual Piety: Pilgrims and religious Renewal in Côte d'Ivoire', in Vered Amit and Noel Dyck (eds), *Claiming Individuality: The cultural Politics of Distinct*, London:

Pluto Press, 2006, pp. 173–200; and, Mathias Savadogo, 'L'intervention des associations musulmanes dans le champ politique en Côte d'Ivoire depuis 1990', in Muriel Gomez-Perez (ed.), *L'Islam politique au Sud du Sahara*, pp. 583–600.

11. In the case of Niger, the ANAFI hosted radio programmes (Radio R et M, Radio anfani) for a francophone audience (Hassane, 'Les nouvelles élites Islamiques du Niger', p. 141). In the case of Mali, since 1994 preachers appeared as often on television as they did on *Radio Islamique* (Benjamin Soares, 'Islam in Mali in the Neoliberal Era', *African Affairs*, 105/418, 2005, p. 80). In the case of Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, see Muriel Gomez-Perez, Marie-Nathalie LeBlanc and Mathias Savadogo, 'Young Men and Islam in the 1990s: Rethinking an Intergenerational Perspective', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, vol. 39, no. 2, 2009, pp. 186–218.
12. However, it is important to note that in Mali, from the mid-1980s, Haïdara distributed his sermons on audio and video cassette. See Dorothea Schulz, 'Political Factions, ideological Fictions: The controversy Over Family Law reform in Democratic Mali', *Islamic Law and society*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2003, pp. 132–164.
13. Olivier Roy, 'Le post-Islamisme', *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, vols 85–86, 1999, p. 23.
14. Abdoulaye Sounaye, '*Izala* au Niger: une alternative de communauté religieuse', in Laurent Fourchard, Odile Goerg and Muriel Gomez-Perez, (eds), *Lieux de sociabilité urbaine en Afrique*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2009a, pp. 481–500; idem., 'Islam, Etat et Société: à la recherche d'une éthique publique', in Benjamin Soares and René Otayek (eds), *Islam, Etat et Société en Afrique*, Paris: Karthala, 2009b, pp. 327–352; Miran, *Islam, histoire et modernité*; Hassane, 'Les nouvelles élites Islamiques du Niger'; Robert Glew, 'Islamic Associations in Niger', *Islam et Sociétés au sud du Sahara*, vol. 10, November 1996, pp. 187–204.
15. Niandou Souley and Alzouma, 'Islamic Renewal in Niger', p. 255.
16. Dorothea Schulz, 'Charisma and Brotherhood revisited: Mass-mediated forms of spirituality in Urban Mali', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2003, pp. 146–171.
17. René Otayek, 'L'affirmation élitaire des arabisants au Burkina Faso. Enjeux et contradictions', in René Otayek (ed.), *Le radicalisme Islamique au sud du Sahara. Da'wa, arabisation et critique de l'Occident*, Paris: Karthala, 1993, p. 241.
18. Meunier, *Dynamique de l'enseignement*, p. 197.
19. Ibid., p. 174.
20. Trained at the Franco-Arabic Falilou MBacké College in Dakar, as well as foreign schools. See Muriel Gomez-Perez, 'Une histoire des associations Islamiques sénégalaises', Saint-Louis, Dakar, Thiès: Itinéraires, stratégies et prises de parole (1930–1993), thèse de doctorat nouveau régime, Université Paris 7-Denis Diderot, 2 tomes, 1997, p. 637 and Gomez-Perez, 'Généalogie de l'Islam réformiste au Sénégal'.

21. He became known among the pro-Arab activists during the third convention of the Union nationale des étudiants en langue Arabe [National Union of Arab-Speaking Students] in 1971. He served as president of the organization at the time. He defended the status of Arab-speaking students and especially fought for the autonomy of his organization vis-à-vis the central powers. Government officials cancelled his stipend. In 1975, he was permitted to continue his studies. Registered at the Faculty of Law and Islamic Legislation in *Al-Azhar*, he became president of the Union of Senegalese Students in Cairo. In 1979, having returned to Dakar, he supported his brother in the latter's project of creating an Islamic political party. See Gomez-Perez, 'Une histoire des associations Islamiques sénégalaises'; and Gomez-Perez, 'L'Islamisme à Dakar: d'un contrôle social total à une culture du pouvoir?', *Afrika Spectrum*, vol. 29, 1994, pp. 79–98.
22. LeBlanc, 'Proclaiming Individual Piety', op. cit., pp. 178–181.
23. Savadogo, 'L'intervention des associations musulmanes', p. 590.
24. Hassane, 'Les nouvelles élites Islamiques du Niger', p. 379.
25. Gomez-Perez, 'L'Islamisme à Dakar'; Roman Loimeier, 'Cheikh Touré. Du réformisme à l'Islamisme, un musulman sénégalais dans le siècle', *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, vol. 8, November 1994, pp. 55–66. Beginning in 1977, Cheikh Touré published several magazines: *La loi islamique du travail* [Islamic Labour Law], *Le code de la famille musulmane* [Islamic Code of Family Law], *L'Etat islamique, ses spécificités et ses caractéristiques* [The Islamic State, its Specificities and Characteristics], *L'Islam au Sénégal, le vrai et le faux* [Islam in Senegal, the Truth and the Falsehoods].
26. Founder of *Jamra*, son of Abbas Gueye, former union activist and former member of the French National Assembly, trained as a journalist, former Marxist-Leninist activist. See (Gomez-Perez, 'L'Islamisme à Dakar').
27. LeBlanc, 'Proclaiming Individual Piety'.
28. A branch of the tidiane brotherhood, established in the Kaolack region of Senegal.
29. Meunier, O., *Dynamique de l'enseignement*, p. 172.
30. This group was already well represented in the 1950s, see Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya*.
31. See Gomez-Perez, 'Généalogie de l'Islam réformiste au Sénégal'; and Gomez-Perez, 'Une histoire des associations Islamiques sénégalaises'.

32. These were 'small businessmen gone bankrupt because of [...] the economic crisis [...] since the end of the 1980s', Meunier, *Dynamique de l'enseignement*, pp. 197–198.
33. Dorothea Schulz, 'Charisma and Brotherhood revisited: Mass-mediated forms of spirituality in Urban Mali', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2003, pp. 146–171.
34. See David Westerlund, 'Reaction and Action: Accounting for the rise of Islamism', in David Westerlund and Eva Evers Rosander (eds), *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists*, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997, pp. 308–333.
35. Abdoulaye Niandou Souley, 'Les 'licenciés du Caire' et l'État du Niger', in René Otayek (ed.), *Le radicalisme Islamique au sud du Sahara. Da'wa, arabisation et critique de l'Occident*, Paris: Karthala, 1993, pp. 213–252.
36. John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
37. Gomez-Perez, 'The Association des Étudiants Musulmans'; and Gomez-Perez, 'Généalogie de l'Islam réformiste au Sénégal'.
38. Otayek, 'Une relecture Islamique du projet révolutionnaire de Thomas Sankara', Jean-François Bayart (ed.), *Religion et modernité politique en Afrique noire*, Paris: Karthala, 1993, pp. 101–127.
39. Louis Brenner, 'Constructing Muslim Identities in Mali', Louis Brenner (ed.), *Muslim identity and social change in sub-saharan Africa*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 59–77.
40. Fabienne Samson, *Les Marabouts de l'Islam politique. Le Dahiratoul Moustarchidina Wal Moustarchitady, un mouvement néo-confrérique sénégalais*, Paris: Karthala, 2005.
41. Olivier Roy, *L'échec de l'Islam politique*, Paris: Seuil, 1992, p. 124.
42. See *Le Manifeste pour la réhabilitation de l'Islam au Niger [Manifesto for the Restoration of Islam in Niger]*
43. Brenner, 'Constructing Muslim Identities in Mali', p. 190.
44. Miran, *Islam, histoire et modernité*; Savadogo, 'L'intervention des associations musulmanes'.
45. Savadogo, 'L'intervention des associations musulmanes', p. 595.
46. Ibid.; Daouda Gary-Tounkara, 'La communauté musulmane et la conquête de l'égalité politique dans la Côte d'Ivoire de l'ivoirité (1993–2000)', in Muriel Gomez-Perez (ed.), *L'Islam politique au sud du Sahara: Identités, discours et enjeux*, Paris: Karthala, 2005, pp. 601–620.
47. Sounaye, 'Islam, Etat et Société'; and Sounaye, 'Les politiques de l'Islam', 2005.
48. Sounaye, 'Islam, Etat et Société'; idem., Sounaye, 'Les politiques de l'Islam'; Gomez-Perez, *L'Islam politique au sud du Sahara*; Gomez-Perez, 'Généalogie de l'Islam réformiste au Sénégal'; Roman Loimeier, 'L'Islam ne se vend plus: The Islamic reform Movement and the State in Senegal', *Journal of religion in Africa*, vol. XXX, no. 2, 2000, pp. 168–190.

49. Hassane,'Les nouvelles élites Islamiques du Niger'.
50. Soares, 'Islam in Mali in the Neoliberal Era'; Schulz, 'Political Factions, ideological Fictions: The controversy Over Family Law reform in Democratic Mali', *Islamic Law and society*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2003a, pp. 132–164.
51. Abdouramane Idrissa, 'Modèle Islamique et modèle occidental: le conflit des élites au Niger', in Gomez-Perez (ed.), *L'Islam politique au sud du Sahara. Identités, discours, enjeux*, Paris: Karthala, 2005, pp. 345–372; and Sounaye, 'Les politiques de l'Islam'.
52. Sounaye, 'Les politiques de l'Islam'.
53. Idrissa, 'Modèle Islamique et modèle occidental'.
54. The Quota Act ensures women's greater participation in electoral positions and government posts.
55. See Alidou and Alidou, 'Women, Religion and the discourses of legal ideology in Niger Republic'.
56. Hassane, 'Les nouvelles élites Islamiques du Niger'.
57. Otayek, 'L'affirmation élitaire des arabisants au Burkina Faso', p. 243.
58. Hassane, 'Les nouvelles élites Islamiques du Niger'.
59. John L. Esposito, 'Political Islam and Gulf security', in John L. Esposito, *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or reform?*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 53–74.
60. Yves Goussault, 'Les frontières contestées du politique et du religieux dans le tiers Monde', *Tiers Monde*, July-September, no. 123, 1990, p. 493.
61. Gomez-Perez, 'Généalogie de l'Islam réformiste au Sénégal'.
62. Gomez-Perez, 'The Association des Étudiants Musulmans'; and Gomez-Perez, *L'Islam politique au sud du Sahara*.
63. Roy, *L'échec de l'Islam politique*, pp. 60–61.
64. Marie-Nathalie LeBlanc and Muriel Gomez-Perez, 'Jeunes musulmans et citoyenneté culturelle: retour sur des expériences de recherche en Afrique de l'Ouest francophone', *Sociologie et Société*, 2007.
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66. Assimi Kouanda, 'La lutte pour l'occupation et le contrôle des espaces réservés aux cultes à Ouagadougou', René Otayek, Filiga-Michel Sawadogo and Jean-Pierre Guingané (eds), *Le Burkina entre révolution et démocratie (1983–1993)*, Paris: Karthala, 1996, p. 94.

67. Miran, *Islam, histoire et modernité.*
68. Alain Roussillon, 'L'Occident dans l'imaginaire des hommes et des femmes du Machreq et du Maghreb', in *Revue Vingtième siècle*, 'Islam et politique en Méditerranée au 20ème siècle', April/June, no. 82, 2004, p. 78.
69. Chris Hann, 'Problems with the (de)privatization of religion', *Anthropology Today*, vol. 16, no. 6, 2000, pp. 14–20; and José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
70. Marie-Nathalie LeBlanc, 'Proclaiming Individual Piety', p. 193.
71. See Louis Audet-Gosselin and Muriel Gomez-Perez, 'L'opposition au projet ZACA à Ouagadougou (2001–2003): feu de paille ou mutations profondes de l'islam burkinabè?', *Revue canadienne des Études africaines*, forthcoming; Gomez-Perez, LeBlanc and Savadogo, 'Young Men and Islam in the 1990s'; LeBlanc and Gomez-Perez, 'Jeunes musulmans et citoyenneté culturelle'.
72. Niandou Souley, 'Les 'licenciés du Caire', p. 258.
73. Dorothea Schulz, 'Promises of (im)mediate salvation: Islam, broadcast media, and the remaking of religious experience in Mali', *American Ethnologist*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2006, p. 215.
74. Hassane, 'Les nouvelles élites Islamiques du Niger', p. 373.
75. Schulz, 'Promises of (im)mediate salvation', p. 215.
76. 'The Chérif Madani (Haidara) visited Bobo-Dioulasso four times (1992, 1995, 2001 and 2004). The followers were almost exclusively as businessmen and farmers, but there were also workers, civil servants and even soldiers present. [...] The strength of the movement resided with the youth [...]. This was why the speeches recorded on audiocassette were listened to alongside the music of Alpha Blondy, Fakoly-Dja, Black-So-Man during teas', Djigui Traoré, 'Islam et politique à Bobo-Dioulasso de 1940 à 2002', in Gomez-Perez, M. (ed.), *L'Islam politique au sud du Sahara. Identités, discours, enjeux*, p. 439.
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78. Marie-Nathalie LeBlanc, 'The production on Islamic identities through knowledge claims in Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire', *African Affairs*, vol. 98, 1999, p. 506.
79. Benjamin Soares, 'Islam and Public Piety in Mali', in Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman, *Public Islam and the Common Good*, Leiden: Brill, 2004, pp. 205–226.
80. Schulz, 'Charisma and Brotherhood revisited', p. 152.
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82. Emmanuel Grégoire, 'Islam and The Identity of Merchants in Maradai (Niger)', in Brenner, *Muslim identity and social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 107 and 112.
83. LeBlanc, 'The production on Islamic identities'; and '*Imaniya* and Young Muslim Women'.
84. Gomez-Perez and LeBlanc, *L'Afrique d'une génération à l'autre*, Paris: Karthala, forthcoming; Muriel Gomez-Perez, 'Autour de mosquées à Ouagadougou et à Dakar: lieux de sociabilité et reconfiguration des communautés musulmanes', in Fourchard, Goerg, and Gomez-Perez, (eds), *Lieux de sociabilité urbaine en Afrique*, pp. 405–433; and Gomez-Perez, LeBlanc and Savadogo, 'Young Men and Islam in the 1990s'.
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90. François Constantin and Christina Coulon, 'Religion et démocratie. Introduction à une problématique africaine', in François Constantin, and Christian Coulon (eds), *Religion et transition démocratique en Afrique*, Paris: Karthala, 1997, p. 19.
91. Schulz, 'Charisma and Brotherhood revisited'.
92. Mamadou Diouf, 'Engaging Postcolonial Cultures: African Youth and Public Space', *African Studies Review*, vol. 46, no. 1, September, 2003, pp. 1–12.

7. THE 'OTHER' POLITICAL ISLAM: UNDERSTANDING SALAFI POLITICS

1. The Salafi movement constitutes a strict and puritanical branch of Islam trying to 'purify' the Islamic creed and its religious applications of all